North Korea’s Nuclearization Process and Threat to Global Security: Exploring the Carrot and Stick Approaches as Panacea

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ABSTRACT
A number of threats to regional and global security on different fronts have been prevalent in the past decades but the unfolding volatile security threat in the Korean peninsula gives more cause for concern. The case of North Korea and its nuclear build up is pivotal to this discourse. In the light of this, less frequently discussed are the measures that have been employed over the years to dissuade states from nuclear proliferation. At a time like this when nuclear nonproliferation has become a top-notch foreign policy priority among the comity of nations, this paper adopted a qualitative approach in x-raying the trajectory of North Korea’s nuclearization process and the threat it poses to global security using the carrot and stick approaches as panacea. The paper did a content analysis of secondary data from which relevant findings were made. The recommendations revolved around need for all major actors in the North Korea crisis to go back to the negotiation table to reappraise the circumstances that led to the current North Korea nuclearization programme; the United States of America as a major actor needs to properly identify and effectively utilize the dynamics of the carrot and stick approaches in resolving the issue with North Korea; there is need for synergy among the UN security council members in evolving a unified action plan that will identify the weak points of North Korea and use same as bases for negotiation in the quest for global peace and security. More so, Washington needs to do away with verbal warfare with Pyongyang and be more diplomatic and persuasive in handling the North Korea nuclear crisis. Finally, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia need to take a definite stand over the North Korean nuclear crisis in the efforts to ensure stability in the region and also preserve global security.

Keywords: North Korea, Nuclearization Process, Threat, Global Security, Carrot and Stick.

INTRODUCTION
The Korean peninsula has no doubt had its own share in the global crisis inventory. Aptly described as a rogue state North Korea has been at the centre of the game. Seemingly paranoid North Korea broke up with South Korea and has remained rather belligerent, reactive and offensive since then. Consequently, in March 1993, Pyongyang announced its intention to pull out from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; this no doubt threw political leaders in Washington and Seoul into a grim prospect. The reason is not far fetched, a nuclear-armed North Korea, which the truculence of Pyongyang seemed to suggest, would pose a grave threat to and give rise to disequilibrium in international peace and security. The fears were obvious, if North Korea was to acquire the bomb, necessarily South Korea and Japan could not long resist the pressure to follow suit, and a Pandora’s Box would be opened allowing the spread of nuclear weapons throughout Asia and beyond [1].

Amidst global commitment at nuclear limitations and non proliferation, Pyongyang’s nuclear tests in recent times
and prevailing threats against the United States and its allies warrant urgent attention and a degree of discipline that has been apparently lacking in both the Donald Trump and Kim Jung-un administrations. Prior to his inauguration as USA president in 2016, Trump had declared that he would not allow Pyongyang to develop nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems capable of threatening America. Now North Korea is doing just that. This threat is not just against the US alone but also its allies and the world in general; something that gives serious cause for concern and demands urgent action to contain the nuclear threat, but what action? Some analysts [2]; [3]; [4]; [5]; [6]; [7] suggest the use of different forms of coercion, armed force, and even arguing for air strikes to destroy North Korea’s nuclear industry, but others cautioned that military strikes could plunge the peninsula into a paroxysm of war and destruction even more deadly than that of over four decades before. The UN Security Council even debated whether to impose economic sanctions, but this option proved problematic as well, in large part because China and Japan, North Korea’s largest trading partners, were reluctant to support such measures. Skeptics also asked what good it would do to sanction a country that was already one of the most isolated on earth [8]; [9]; [10].

In [11] view with the tools of diplomacy, military force, and economic coercion largely unavailable, Washington turned to the use of incentives. In cooperation with Japan and South Korea, the United States crafted a set of economic and diplomatic incentives that are intended to eventually persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear stockpile. In the Agreed Framework of October 1994, the United States and its partners offered to provide North Korea with fuel oil, new less-proliferation-prone nuclear reactors, and the beginnings of diplomatic recognition. In exchange, Pyongyang agreed to accept international inspections and controls on its nuclear programme. As [12] recounts, the use of incentives proved successful in helping to defuse a dangerous international crisis. Unfortunately, in the North Korea case, critics charged that the Agreed Framework contained no assurances against future violations. They criticized aid for North Korea as a reward for wrongdoing that would encourage other rogue states to engage in similar transgressions in the hope of obtaining like rewards. There have been few studies of the role of incentive strategies (carrots) of which the Marshall Plan is but one example in encouraging responsible behavior by states, especially those that are already in difficulty and could pose a threat to international order. In contrast, vast bodies of literature exist on how to pressure states with economic sanctions and threats of force. This study is built on the belief that incentives that is positive inducements (carrots) could have greater potential for conflict prevention than use of coercion and sanctions (sticks) if they were better understood.

When state actors on a global scale are faced with crises of war and deadly conflict, how do they determine the proper military, economic or diplomatic policy responses? When coercive measures are either unavailable or too risky, as in the North Korea case, what are the alternatives? When are incentives strategies appropriate and how should they be implemented? Examining the cases of failure as well as of success is important for understanding when incentives are appropriate and when the reverse should be the case. It was against this backdrop that this paper sought to examine North Korea’s nuclearization process and threat to global security using carrot and stick approaches as panacea.

**Statement of the Problem**

North Korea under Kim Jung Un has seemingly become a thorn in the flesh of global peace and security especially in the Korean peninsula as a result of its nuclear proliferation. In the light of this the recognition and use of “carrots and
sticks’ as tools of international policy, have assumed currency in the last decade; but much of the attention of analysts is devoted to the latter. The policy options available seem quite limited as the USA is striving to adopt measures that will arrest further nuclearization by North Korea. Negotiations were attempted with the reclusive regime in Pyongyang, but initial discussions proved fruitless and frustrating as demands from Washington seemed only to harden North Korean intransigence. Bearing in mind the challenge this scenario poses to global security, this paper explores carrots and sticks approaches as panacea to crises in the Korean peninsula.

Objectives of the Study
This paper x-rays the trajectory of North Korea’s nuclearization process and the threat it poses to global security using the carrot and stick approach as panacea. In specifics the paper shall realize the following objectives, to:
1) Expose the antecedents in the North Korea experience at nuclear programme;

METHODOLOGY
The research design is exploratory. The goal of exploratory design is to discover ideas and insights. This study employed the exploratory design in order to provide a better understanding of North Korea’s nuclearization process and threat to global security using carrot and stick approaches as panacea. In addition to the exploratory design, this study employed qualitative method in its data collection and analyses. Primarily, qualitative research seeks to understand and interpret the meaning of situations or events from the perspectives of the people involved and as understood by them (in this relying absolutely on documented evidence). It is generally inductive rather than deductive in its approach, that is, it generates theory from interpretation of the evidence, albeit against a theoretical background. Thus qualitative measures are often binary in that they are interested in the presence or absence of phenomena. This study relied ultimately on evidences drawn from secondary sources. Secondary data is made up of documented and archival materials of great relevance to the subject matter of the study drawn both from extant literature, published works, gazette reports and journals. Also textbooks by eminent scholars, newspapers, magazines and internet sources were also found useful and therefore formed part of the secondary source of data for the study.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Carrot and Stick Approach of Motivation is a traditional motivation theory that asserts, in motivating people to elicit desired behaviors, sometimes the rewards are given in the form of money, promotion, and any other financial or non-financial benefits and sometimes the punishments are exerted to push an individual towards the desired behavior. The Carrot and Stick approach of motivation is based on the principles of reinforcement and is given by a philosopher Jeremy Bentham, during the industrial revolution. This theory is derived from the old story of a donkey,
the best way to move him is to put a carrot in front of him and jab him with a stick from behind. The carrot is a reward for moving while the stick is the punishment for not moving and hence making him move forcefully.

Thus, an individual is given carrot i.e. reward when he performs efficiently and is jabbed with a stick or is given a punishment in case of non-performance. While giving the punishments, the following points need to be taken care of:

1. Punishment is said to be effective in modifying the behavior if an individual selects a desirable alternative behavior.
2. If the above condition does not occur the behavior will be temporarily suppressed and may reappear after the punishment is over.
3. The punishment is more effective when given at the time the undesirable behavior is actually performed.
4. The management should make sure, that punishment is properly administered and does not become a reward for the undesirable behavior.

Thus, carrot and stick approach of motivation should be applied carefully such that, both have the positive motivational effect on the people in the organization.

Relating the approach to the present study, [13] asserts that the idea sometimes appears as a metaphor for the realist concept of 'hard power'. The carrot might be a promise of economic aid from one nation to another; the stick might be a threat of military action.

**North Korea’s Nuclear Programme in Historical Perspective**

North Korea’s nuclearization intent is seemingly rooted in its paranoid attitude towards its neighbours. This spans for over five decades and half. In specifics, North Korea nuclear programme can be traced back to about 1962, when Pyongyang committed itself to what it called "all-fortressization", which was the beginning of the hyper-militarized North Korea of today [14]. In 1963, it sought the assistance of the then Soviet Union (USSR) in developing nuclear weapons, but was turned down. The Soviet Union agreed to help North Korea develop a peaceful nuclear energy programme, including the training of nuclear scientists. Later, China, after its nuclear tests, similarly rejected North Korean requests for help with developing nuclear weapons [15].

Later Soviet experts and engineers took part in the construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center [16] and began construction of an IRT-2000 research reactor in 1963, which became operational in 1965 and was upgraded to 8 MW in 1974. In 1979 North Korea indigenously began to build in Yongbyon a second research reactor, an ore processing plant and a fuel rod fabrication plant [17]. By 1980, North Korea’s nuclear weapons development commenced proper. Focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system, North Korea began to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion, and conducted high-explosive detonation tests [18]. In 1985 North Korea ratified the NPT but did not include the required safeguards agreement with the IAEA until 1992 [19]. Furthermore, in early 1993, while verifying North Korea’s initial declaration, the IAEA concluded that there was strong evidence this declaration was incomplete. When North Korea refused the requested special inspection, the IAEA reported its noncompliance to the UN Security Council. In reaction in 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT, but suspended that withdrawal before it took effect [20].

With the coming into effect of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the U.S. agreed to facilitate the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea in exchange for North Korean disarmament (Arms Control Association, [21]. Such reactors are considered "more proliferation-resistant than North Korea's graphite-moderated
"proliferation proof" [22]. There were challenges in the implementation of the Agreed Framework, thus in 2002 it fell apart, with each side blaming the other for its collapse. By 2002, Pakistan had admitted that North Korea had gained access to Pakistan's nuclear technology in the late 1990s [23]. Evidences from Pakistan and Libya in addition to multiple confessions from North Korea itself, made the US accuse Pyongyang of noncompliance and halted oil shipments; North Korea later claimed its public confession of guilt had been deliberately misconstrued. By the end of 2002, the Agreed Framework was officially abandoned. Pyongyang again in 2003 announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty [24]. In 2005, it admitted to having nuclear weapons but vowed to close the nuclear programme [25]; [26].

In 2006 October 9 precisely, North Korea announced its successful conduct of its first nuclear test. Consequently an underground nuclear explosion was detected, its yield was estimated at less than a kiloton, and some radioactive output was detected [27]; [28]. Again on January 6, 2007, Pyongyang confirmed it had nuclear weapons [29].

Surprisingly, at the international nuclear talks held on March 17, 2007, North Korea informed delegates that it was preparing to shut down its main nuclear facility. An agreement was later reached following series of six-party talks, comprising North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States, which begun in 2003. According to the agreement, a list of its nuclear programmes would be submitted and the nuclear facility would be disabled in exchange for fuel aid and normalization talks with the United States and Japan [30]. This was delayed from April due to a dispute with the United States over Banco Delta Asia, but on July 14, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors confirmed the shutdown of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor and consequently North Korea began to receive aid (BBC News. July 16, 2007). This agreement again collapsed in 2009, as a result of Pyongyang’s satellite launch.

Following the satellite launch, reports emerged in April 2009 that North Korea has become a “fully fledged nuclear power”, a position also shared by then International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei [31]. A second nuclear test was conducted by North Korea, on May 25, 2009, resulting in an explosion estimated to be between 2 and 7 kilotons. The 2009 test, like that of 2006, was believed to have occurred at Mantapsan, Kilju County, in the north-eastern part of North Korea. This was found by an earthquake occurring at the test site [32].

Reports from relevant sources [33]; [34]; [35], revealed that in February 2012, Pyongyang announced that it would suspend uranium enrichment at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and will no longer conduct further tests of nuclear weapons while productive negotiations with Washington continue. This agreement included a moratorium on long-range missiles tests. Additionally, North Korea agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor operations at Yongbyon. The United States reaffirmed that it had no hostile intent toward Pyongyang and was prepared to improve bilateral relationships, and agreed to ship humanitarian food aid to North Korea The United States called the move “important, if limited”, but said it would proceed cautiously and that talks would resume only after North Korea made steps toward fulfilling its promise [36]. However, after Pyongyang conducted a long-range missile test in April 2012, the United States decided not to proceed with the food aid [37].

According to [38], on February 11, 2013, the U.S. Geological Survey (2013) detected a magnitude 5.1 seismic disturbance, reported to be a third underground nuclear test. North Korea has officially reported it as a successful nuclear test with a lighter
warhead that delivers more force than before, but has not revealed the exact yield. Multiple South Korean sources estimated the yield at 6–9 kilotons [39], while the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (2013) estimated the yield at 40 kilotons. However, the German estimate has since been revised to a yield equivalent of 14 kt when they published their estimations in January 2016.

Not deterred by global condemnation, North Korea continued with her nuclearization process. On January 6, 2016, the United States Geological Survey detected a fresh magnitude 5.1 seismic disturbance, reported to be a fourth underground nuclear test, to which Pyongyang claimed involved a hydrogen bomb [40]. A "hydrogen bomb" could mean one of several degrees of weapon, ranging from enhanced fission devices to true thermonuclear weapons. This indeed poses serious threat to global security and gives cause for concern.

Consequently, many nations and organizations condemned the test (Channel News Asia, 2016). Furthermore, on February 7, 2016, roughly a month after the alleged hydrogen bomb test, North Korea claimed to have put a satellite into orbit around the Earth. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe had warned the North to not launch the rocket, and if it did and the rocket violated Japanese territory, it would be shot down. Nevertheless, North Korea launched the rocket anyway, claiming the satellite was purely intended for peaceful, scientific purposes. Several nations, including the United States, Japan, and South Korea, have criticized the launch, and despite Pyongyang’s claims that the rocket was for peaceful purposes, it has been heavily criticized as an attempt to perform an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICBM test under the guise of a peaceful satellite launch. China also criticized the launch, however urged "the relevant parties" to "refrain from taking actions that may further escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula" (BBC News, 2016).

A fifth nuclear test occurred on September 9, 2016. This test yield is considered the highest among all five tests thus far, surpassing its previous record in 2013. The South Korean government said that the yield was about 10 kt (BBC News, 2016) despite other sources suggesting a 20 to 30 kt yield [41]. The same German source which has made estimation of all North Korea's previous nuclear tests suggested an estimation of a 25 kiloton yield (BGRS, 2016). To this end, handful nations together with the United Nations have responded to North Korea's ongoing missile and nuclear development with a variety of sanctions; on March 2, 2016, the UN Security Council voted to impose additional sanctions against Pyongyang [42].

Still poised in its nuclear proliferation quest, in 2017, Pyongyang’s provocations continued when it test-launched two Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the second of which had sufficient range to reach the continental United States [43]. In September 2017 the country announced a further "perfect" hydrogen bomb test. The same uncertainty as to the type of weapon tested applies, as it did to the 2016 test.

From the above discourse we can sift the unquenchable ambition of North Korea to acquire nuclear power. This move is indeed worrisome considering the reactionary disposition of Pyongyang. The question that needs be asked at this point is; how does this nuclearization programme constitute threat to global security.

**North Korea's Nuclearization Process as Threat to Global Security**

North Korea has drawn global attention unto itself following its nuclear programme. Though it may not yet be certain whether the September 3 2017 nuclear test was a hydrogen weapon. However, an estimated 50-kiloton-plus detonation enhanced the Kim Jong-un's regime's confidence in its ability to inflict
major damage on the United States and its allies. Pyongyang now asserts that it possesses a nuclear deterrent against the United States, but it remains untested on a missile. Questions remain about North Korea’s ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead able to reach the United States; whether one of its warheads could survive the stress, speed, and heat of atmospheric reentry; and whether it could be targeted with reasonable accuracy. The fact of the North’s rapid progress much sooner than U.S. intelligence predicted until very recently is sobering enough. Answers to these larger questions may not be long in coming. North Korea’s recent test of a nuclear-capable Hwasong-12 intermediate-range missile over Japan was a major breakthrough to North Korea but a serious threat to global security. To avoid overflying Japan, Pyongyang had previously limited its test of intermediate- and longer-range missiles to lofted trajectories aimed at the Sea of Japan. This prevented the North from testing a more realistic combat trajectory that would have enhanced Pyongyang’s confidence in the reliability of its missiles (Channel News Asia, 2016).

The August 29 Hwasong-12 launch flew successfully and unopposed over Japan (one of its potential targets) as it travelled to half its maximum operational range. Neither Japanese nor American missile-defense systems based in or near Japan attempted to intercept the missile. This could very likely embolden North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to test launch an ICBM over the same trajectory but over far greater distance. Such a test, particularly if it included the successful reentry of a test warhead, would signal that North Korea’s deterrent now poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Testimony by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service to the ROK National Assembly indicates that North Korea may be readying such an ICBM test, which is very troubling [44].

Probably the most important decision facing President Trump and his national security team concerns whether the United States can slow or otherwise impede the North Korea’s quickly advancing nuclear and missile threats. Some have suggested using military means to do so. While “all options” may be on the table, the use of force against North Korea would result in the deaths of many thousands of Americans and far larger numbers of South Koreans and Japanese. Any resulting conflict could easily involve the use of nuclear weapons. For these reasons, there is no realistic military option short of an attack by North Korea on the United States or one of America’s allies, or credible information that Pyongyang is readying for such an attack.

The imperative need to impede Pyongyang’s missile-related development and prevent it from threatening the U.S. homeland should prompt a number of previously deferred policy decisions. This should begin by revisiting the idea of intercepting incoming North Korean missiles. Despite the technical uncertainties, this is an idea whose time has come. North Korea is on the cusp of being able to attack the United States and its allies with medium- and long-range missiles, and has already stated it is prepared to do so. Washington should therefore issue a declaratory policy that the United States will deem any future launches of North Korean missiles toward the United States, its territories, or its allies, including those flying over the territory of an American ally, as a direct threat, and will be addressed with the full range of U.S. and allied defensive capabilities [45].

Unlike an attack on North Korea’s missile and nuclear facilities, such an action would be a legitimate and justifiable self-defense measure. While an attempted shoot-down might not succeed, it would demonstrate a determination to sustain and advance such efforts, putting the burden of risk on North Korea in challenging the United States and its allies and of escalating any potential global security crisis. The danger of failing to respond to a qualitatively different North
Korean security threat outweighs any risks associated with this approach, including the unlikely possibility that Pyongyang might resort to war.

The Carrots (incentives) and Sticks (sanctions) Approach as Panacea to Threats to Global Security

Much has been written about the use of incentives and economic sanctions in international relations, but surprisingly little attention has been devoted to the role of positive incentives in shaping the political relations among nations (David & George, 1995). Incentives seem inseparable from the art of diplomacy. The use of military, economic, and diplomatic coercion is widely studied [46]. The role of carrots political and economic inducements for cooperation is often a neglected stepchild [47].

Most authors agree that the inducement process involves the offer of a reward by a sender in exchange for a particular action or response by a recipient [48]; [49]. An incentive is defined as the granting of a political or economic benefit in exchange for a specified policy adjustment by the recipient nation. Often the incentive offered is directly related to the desired policy outcome, as when the World Bank assisted demilitarization in Uganda and Mozambique by providing financial support for demobilized combatants. It is also possible and sometimes necessary to conceive of incentives in a more unconditional manner, without the requirement for strict reciprocity. This is what [5] called the “pure” form of incentives where there is little or no explicit conditionality. A sender may offer benefits in the hope of developing or strengthening long-term cooperation, without insisting upon an immediate policy response. In some circumstances, such as the Council of Europe’s negotiations with Estonia, the principal incentive may be the simple fact of membership itself, and the accompanying hope that a seat at the table may lead to other more concrete benefits in the future. At a minimum, incentives policies seek to make cooperation and conciliation more attractive than aggression and hostility. The goal is to achieve a degree of policy coordination in which, according to [34], nations “adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others”.

In applying the carrots approach, inducement and incentive are sometimes used interchangeably, but there are subtle differences between the two terms. Inducement has a more holistic and inclusive connotation and can encompass not only economic measures but also security assurances and offers of political association. Inducement is also a more directive term. It can be made into a verb and implies leading or moving one to action by persuasion or influence. The connotation suggests overcoming indifference or opposition by offering persuasive advantages that bring about a desired decision. Incentive, defined as a stimulus or encouragement to action, has many of these same connotations. In practical terms the differences between the two words are minor, and it is not necessary to distinguish rigidly between them. Incentive is the more common term and is used most frequently in this paper to refer to carrots approach.

In his classics, Economic Statecraft, [11] offered the following examples of what he termed “positive sanctions”: Granting most-favored-nation status, tariff reductions, direct purchases, subsidies to exports or imports, providing export or import licenses, foreign aid, guaranteeing investments, encouraging capital imports or exports, favorable taxation, promises of the above. Other examples that could be added to Baldwin’s list include: granting access to advanced technology, offering diplomatic and political support, military cooperation, environmental and social cooperation, cultural exchanges, support for citizen diplomacy, debt relief, security assurances, granting membership in international organizations or security alliances and lifting negative sanctions. Many studies, such as [18] Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation,
focus on economic instruments such as trade policy or financial assistance. Much of the discussion of incentives policy and many of the cases examined here emphasize the primacy of economic incentives. Policymakers often juggle a range of policy tools, however, and it is important to consider all of the options—political and military as well as economic—that may be a part of an incentives strategy. Our approach in this paper is adopting a more holistic definition and examining a range of cases in which many different incentives methods are applied to realize the targeted objectives.

Comparing Incentives and Sanctions as Tools of International Policy

Carrots and sticks are spoken of separately, but in fact they are two sides of the same coin. Ending a negative sanction may be considered a positive incentive, while removing an incentive can be a sanction. In many cases the primary form of incentive is the removal of a sanction. In economic theory, incentives and sanctions are often interchangeable. An incentive is a positive sanction, a sanction, a negative incentive. Each is designed to influence the recipient and bring about a desired change of behaviour.

Carrots and sticks are often combined, as several case studies amply illustrate. Incentives can be offered to increase the attractiveness of the preferred course of action, while sanctions may be threatened if the objectionable behaviour is not halted. Coercive diplomacy often requires offers, in addition to threats, to achieve success [23]. According to [20], the use of negative sanctions can lay the groundwork for the subsequent application of positive incentives. A mix of carrots and sticks is present in almost every attempt to influence the affairs of other nations.

While sanctions and incentives have much in common, there are also significant differences between the two. For the sender state, the perceived financial impact of sanctions and incentives may vary considerably. In narrow accounting terms, a sanction is not a cost. When countries impose an embargo on an offending state, this does not show up as a line item in the national budget. As a result, some policymakers naively consider economic sanctions to be a kind of “foreign policy on the cheap” (Kimberly, 1993). In reality, sanctions can impose significant costs on private companies, local communities, and even national governments. Since these losses seldom appear as state expenditures, however, they are easy to overlook or ignore. By contrast, foreign assistance, loan guarantees, and other forms of economic incentives are usually listed as specific budgetary allocations, which can make them easy targets of budget cutters.

Trade and technology incentives impose fewer costs on governments. Partly as a result they are becoming a preferred tool of economic statecraft. While incentives do not require budget allocations, they have financial implications. U.S. budget legislation mandates that reductions in revenue from any source, including the lowering of tariffs, must be offset by tax increases or compensating budget reductions [3]. Trade incentives increase the overall level of commerce, however, and usually result in increased government revenues. Commercial incentives also open up new opportunities for commerce that can benefit domestic constituencies [17]. Where sanctions impose costs on particular industries and communities, trade incentives can bring benefits to these groups. As a result, domestic constituencies in the sender state may gain a stake in maintaining trade preferences and provide political support for sustaining the incentives policy. Incentives also create economic benefits in the recipient nation and can generate similar supportive pressures there as well.

In contrast to sanctions, which cause hardships for the sender and the recipient, trade incentives bring benefits to both. They are a classic win-win
Trade incentives are not without their limitations, however. With the lowering of tariffs and trade barriers through the North American Free Trade Agreement and similar arrangements, the impact of incremental trade preferences has diminished in recent years. Government policymakers have fewer commercial preference options in an era of growing free trade. There is also the problem of the apparent decline in the effectiveness of trade incentives over time. As the case of China and North Korea seemingly illustrates, the development of powerful vested interests in the sender state can make it extremely difficult to withdraw benefits, even when the behaviour of the recipient state no longer justifies incentives. A related problem is the tendency for a recipient's expectations to rise over time, thereby diminishing the value of previous incentives. As concessions from an earlier period are taken for granted, they tend to lose their effectiveness. A similar problem exists with sanctions, which lose their impact over time as target nations adjust to external pressures.

Sanctions and incentives also have differing impacts on international trade and the prospects for economic cooperation. One of the most significant, many would say most hopeful, characteristics of the post-cold war world has been the widespread expansion of free markets and substantial increase in international commerce. [5] has spoken of "the trading state" phenomenon as a powerful antidote to war and armed conflict. Expanding trade and economic interdependence can establish a long-term foundation for peace and enhanced international cooperation, as discussed in several of our case studies. The use of economic sanctions runs counter to this trend. Economist [41] has argued that the greater use of negative sanctions may threaten the expansion of trade, thereby weakening the incentive for political cooperation that comes with increasing economic interdependence.

The differences between incentives and sanctions have important implications for the conduct of political communications between sender and recipient. This is because incentives create less resentment and obstinacy in the recipient, communication is clearer and more precise, and negotiations are more likely to succeed. Punitive measures may be effective in expressing disapproval of a particular policy, but they are not conducive to constructive dialogue. Where sanctions generate communications gridlock, incentives open the door to greater interaction and understanding. In this section so far general illustrations have been made without losing the ingredients of the subject matter of the discourse. Consequently the case of North Korea is not far fetched with respect to the application and effects of carrots and sticks approaches in global security.

**Possible Solution to North Korea Crisis:**

[36] assert that the world faces a conundrum on North Korea policy. Simply threatening pre-emptive military strikes or upping the pressure on Pyongyang over its nuclear and long-range missile programs, in the hope that Kim Jong-un will ultimately trade away his nuclear weapons for relief from sanctions, will not work if North Korea sees its nuclear weapons as central to its security and consolidation of its dynastic hold on power. That appears to be the case today. Complete denuclearization of North Korea remains a worthy goal, but it should not be a principal near-term demand.

Rather, the goal of U.S. as well as South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian—policy, should be a verifiable freeze on the testing of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles by North Korea, as well as a freeze on the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that can be used in nuclear bombs. North Korea has shown some openness to the testing idea in return for a freeze on large-scale U.S.-South Korea military exercises. However, American interests require a freeze on the
expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, now estimated at perhaps 60 warheads in size, as well. That should be a minimum demand, and would need to be made as verifiable as the Iran nuclear deal, officially called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015. This paper however, in its search for viable resolution concurs with Snyder (2016) of the United States Institute of Peace in his in-depth analysis of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Beginning with the initial response of the Bush administration and continuing through the sometimes erratic but ultimately successful efforts of the Clinton administration, Snyder traced the diplomatic history of the crisis and highlighted the role of incentives in the bargaining process with Pyongyang. As noted earlier, coercive measures could be sensibly threatened but never to be employed, and Washington had to rely almost entirely on incentives to persuade North Korea to accept limitations and external controls on its nuclear programme. The Agreed Framework plan, which authorized international inspections of North Korea's nuclear installations, in exchange for specified economic and diplomatic commitments from the United States, Japan, and South Korea needs be revisited. As Snyder noted, the Agreed Framework was structured in a strictly conditional manner, with the delivery of each incentive tied to specific policy concessions from Pyongyang.

**Recommendations**

In the light issues reviewed the following recommendations are apt:

1. There is need for all major actors in the North Korea crisis to go back to the negotiation table to reappraise the circumstances that led to the current North Korea nuclearization programme.

2. The United States of America as a major actor needs to properly identify and effectively utilize the dynamics of the carrot and stick approaches in resolving the issue with North Korea.

3. There is need for synergy among the UN Security Council members in evolving a unified action plan that will identify the weak points of North Korea and use same as bases for negotiation in the quest for global peace and security.

4. Washington needs to do away with verbal warfare with Pyongyang and be more diplomatic and persuasive in handling the North Korea nuclear crisis.

5. China, Japan, South Korea and Russia need to take definite stand over the North Korean nuclear crisis in the efforts to ensure stability in the region and also preserve global security.

**CONCLUSION**

Carrots and sticks in this paper was applied figuratively implying incentives and sanctions or force. Effort was made to trace the evolution of North Korea nuclearization as well as the dynamics of incentives and sanction in preservation of global security. The USA was identified as a major actor in the effort to limit North Korea’s nuclear programme; a position that put the two countries at war of words. Most scholars argued for a greater commitment by the United States and other major powers to the use of carrots (incentives) in the form of foreign assistance, especially development aid, as an important tool of international policy. Available evidences in literature also support the superiority of incentives strategies over coercive policies in the conduct of international relations. This paper therefore submits that the process of exerting influence through offers is far more conducive to international peace than the process of exerting influence through threats.

Bearing in mind that incentives are not appropriate in every setting, and may be counterproductive if employed in the face of armed conflict and overt military aggression, they have many advantages
over punitive approaches. History is therefore replete with examples of the power of positive reciprocation. Conciliatory gestures often lead to cooperative responses, while threats usually generate hostility and defiance. Applying these lessons to diplomacy with recourse to North Korea experience, using carrots (incentives) more often than sticks (threats of force and sanctions), offers hope for a peaceful Korea peninsula, the entire South east Asia and transforming the international system and creating a more cooperative and peaceful world order. In conclusion, it must be stated categorically at this point that there are no quick fixes for the North Korean crisis; and attempts at rushed solutions and grand bargains risk unintended consequences.

REFERENCES


