

Trans-Border Migration and Network of Insurgency/Crime: Explaining the Spread of Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria 2009 - 2015

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ABSTRACT

Trans-border migration refers to the movement of people across national boundaries. Involving crossing from one country to another to take advantage of social, economic, political opportunities or even to commit crimes. The magnitude and dimension of this movement and the growing proliferation of small arms and light weapons within the West Africa sub-region has led to growing concern over its effects on the security of States considering the rate of violent attacks by terrorist group (Boko Haram). The objective of this study is to examine if the existence of unmanned borders stimulates intensification of attacks by Boko Haram; to investigate if poor regional counter insurgency cooperation facilitate weapons proliferation and if poor management of pastoral trans-border migration is implicated in extremist radicalization in the northeast. The migrant control propositions extracted from migration theory will be used as our theoretical framework. Secondary source of data will be used as method of data collection while content analysis will be used in analyzing the data. The time series research design was adopted for this study. Our findings includes, that cohesiveness and expansiveness of trans-national network is mainly responsible for the unending flow of cross border migration into and out of Northeast Nigeria. Also, the study conclude that seasonal nature of cross-border transhumance into Nigeria is determine by various socio-economic, political, climatic and ecological push factors arising within these countries of origin, as well as corresponding pull factors within Nigeria. The study recommends that the federal government of Nigeria should prioritize border community security through adequate deployment of security officials to border regions. There should be proper funding and capacity building of these security agencies to enable them manage insurgencies and other crimes in Nigeria borders. Finally the government should focus on economic empowerment of the citizens as that will discourage citizens from being vulnerable to extremist radicalization.

Keywords: Trans-border, Boko haram and Migration.

INTRODUCTION

Trans-border migration refers to the movement of people across national boundaries. It involves crossing from one country into another for varying durations of time, for the purpose of taking advantage of economic, political or social opportunity or for the perpetration of crime [1],[2]. The past two decades have witnessed a steady rise in trans-border migration worldwide, with the number of international migrants worldwide rising by over 77 million or by 50 per cent. Much of this growth occurred between 2000 and 2010, with Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, recording the highest annual average growth rate in migration with 2.8 percent [3]. Census-based estimates by the

United Nations Population Division suggest that West Africa has the largest absolute international immigrant stock in Africa. It is also the only part of sub-Saharan Africa where migration, relative to the total population, has been increasing over the past few decades [4].

The magnitude and dimensions of trans-border movements in sub-Saharan Africa, the growing proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW); the growth of radical anti-state ideologies and movements, and the increasingly aggressive activities of migrant pastoralists has led to growing concerns over the various effects of these phenomena,

particularly as it affects the national security of sovereign states in the sub-region (especially Nigeria which is the economic and demographic superpower of the region).

Nigeria occupies a territory covering 923,768 square kilometers and shares land borders of 770 kilometers with Benin to the west, 90 kilometers with Chad to the northeast, 1,500 kilometers with Niger to the north and 1,700 kilometers with Cameroon to the east [5]. Geopolitically, northeast Nigeria spans an area of 275,667 square kilometers and comprises the states of *Adamawa*, *Bauchi*, *Borno*, *Gombe*, *Taraba* and *Yobe* which host an estimated combined population of 19.5 million people. The region is predominantly peopled by the *Balewa*, *Babur*, *Fulani*, *Mumuye*, *Tangalawaja*, *Tiv* and *Kanuri* ethnic groups, with the *Fulani* and *Kanuri* in particular extending beyond Nigeria's borders into Niger, Chad and Cameroun [6]. Thus, migrant flows occur frequently and easily across the borders with these contiguous countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon, and are perceived by the local populations as being within the same socio-cultural space rather than between different nations [7]; [8].

The fact that there are over 1,499 illegal and 84 officially identified entry routes into Nigeria, confirms the very porous nature of the country's borders [9], and makes the task of securing and monitoring migrant flows across them very difficult. The porosity of Nigeria's borders is due to the way the colonialists delineated them as well as to the management and control of these borders by the Nigerian state. The original objective of the colonial powers in the geopolitical division of the African continent was not to create logical boundaries, but to create spheres of influence driven by political and economic motivations. These boundaries, defined in terms of latitudes, longitudes, geometric circles and straight lines, split several ethnic and cultural communities [10]. Consequently, most African governments have found it difficult to administer borders that slice through ethnic and cultural groups, and to rationalize borders that were not created by them. Thus the geopolitical incongruities of the post-colonial African states provide a context

for understanding the challenges of border control and illegal migration into Nigeria.

Nigerian policy makers appear not to have anticipated the large flow of trans-border migration that was likely to occur as well as the national security implications of such a flow once the country signed and ratified the *ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People* in 1979. Within three years, there was a wave of migrants from *ECOWAS* member states, many of whom did not obtain *ECOWAS* travel documents or arrive through official designated points of entry. Consequently, thousands of migrants, including a large wave of migrants from Niger and Chad [11], began to pour into Nigeria. None-the-less, the Chadian war accounted for the greatest movement of migrants into Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria, and it was the economic opportunities available to the immigrants in Nigeria that provided the sustenance that kept them even longer than before [12]. The issue of illegal flows across the northeastern borders is further exacerbated by the strong and deep-rooted family ties that exist. For instance, between the Kanuri in Borno and those in Chad and Niger, family ties are so strong that many of the royal and noble families on either side are related by blood and marriage. Similarly, some parts of southern Niger are still under the traditional authority of the Shehu of Borno in Nigeria, with Maiduguri serving as a commercial and cultural hub for many Kanuri on both sides of the border. Considering the spread of radical Islamic anti-state ideologies across northern and sub-Saharan Africa as epitomized by terrorist groups such as *Al Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and *Boko Haram* and *Ansaru* in northeast Nigeria, this state of affairs allows for unregulated inflows and easy infiltration by radicalized elements from the neighboring countries.

With time, crimes and vices attributed to immigrants began to elicit xenophobic feelings among many Nigerians, and as the boom of the 1970's gave way to the economic decline of the early 1980's, the Nigerian government was forced to come to terms with the issue of illegal migration. This came in the form of undocumented movements across its borders which include illegal immigrants and the rising incidents of cross-border crimes such as

trafficking in arms, persons, drugs, armed banditry, vehicle theft, smuggling, and the activities of nomadic pastoralists who moved their herds across national borders without regard for border regulations. In response to these, the Nigerian government expelled 2.7 million illegal migrants in 1983 and 1985, citing security reasons. By this action, it revoked articles 4 and 27 of the ECOWAS Protocol, closed its borders and imposed unilateral conditions on the implementation of the Protocol [13].

However, the securitization of migration remains a political necessity, given that the border is the first line of defense against terrorism and the last line of a nation's territorial integrity [14], and has become an imperative objective in most countries [15]. From 2009, Nigeria began to experience new security challenges in the form of terrorist attacks against government institutions, public infrastructure, and individuals. Given the activities of criminal organizations that traffic in SALW and persons, as well as terrorist groups like *Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM) in the Sahel region and the rise of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria's northeast, national and international concern has increased with respect to the flow of illegal movements across Nigeria's northern borders and the security implications inherent therein.

Statement of the Problem

Since 2009, the rise in acts of terrorism committed by the militant Islamist group *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), also known as *Boko Haram*, has created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in northeastern Nigeria in particular, and the entire country in general. The insurgence of this group has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and millions of naira worth of property, eclipsing Nigeria's longstanding security threats such as piracy, militancy in the Niger delta, kidnapping and armed robbery [18]. The group's *modus operandi* often involves brutal attacks within Nigeria, and hasty retreats to safe havens in the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroun.

The incidence of trans-border related insecurity in northeastern Nigeria has

Arguably, the most pressing threat facing the Nigerian state today is the protracted insecurity in the northeastern part of the country, induced largely by the activities of the terrorist group *Boko Haram*. The activities of this group, which has led to thousands of deaths and the destruction of millions of naira worth of public and private infrastructure, have highlighted the dangers of Nigeria's porous northern borders, and have equally drawn attention to the issue of illegal movements of people and arms across them. The proliferation of Small Arms and light Weapons (SALW) is significantly facilitated by the unchecked migrant flows across Nigeria's borders. Of the 640 million SALW in circulation globally, it is estimated that 100 million are found in Africa, about 30 million in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in West Africa alone [16] It has also been noted by [17] that 70 percent of the SALW in West Africa are found in Nigeria. This suggests a strong link between the availability/accessibility of arms and crime in the country. Thus, the central focus of this study is to examine migration and trans-network of insurgency and crime, with a specific focus on the spread of *Boko Haram* across West Africa Sub-region 2009 - 2017.

persisted despite the massive budgetary allocations to the security sector, as well as the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in partnership with Nigeria's immediate neighbors. The existence of other trans-border cooperation arrangements such as bilateral Joint Commissions aimed at strengthening border security and combating transnational threats have met with little success in controlling illegal migration in north-eastern Nigeria.

Given the historical experience of migrant-related violence in northern Nigeria, whereby in the early 1980's, religious disturbances with links to migrant settlers began to manifest in parts of northern Nigeria, particularly in Kano state, the role of immigrants in these disturbances became apparent given that the *Maitatsine* disturbances of the early 1980's was

spearheaded by a radical preacher from northern Cameroun (*Crisis Group Africa Report, 2010*). Also, the mass exodus of *almajiri* into Kano from Niger was identified to be critical in their involvement in the *Maitatsine* crisis of 1981, where it was observed that about 85 per cent of the 187 aliens that were arrested during the disturbance came from Niger Republic [19], and many others from Chad [20].

The arguments by scholars that illegal migrants and asylum-seekers provide channels for potential terrorists [21]; also that irregular migrants participate in illegal, politically destabilizing activities [22] and that the dynamic increase in

irregular migration processes contributes to the rise of new threats to the national security [23] are mostly speculative and fail to establish any concrete evidence linking illegal migration and terrorism.

Furthermore, they fail to show how national security threats arise uniquely from illegal migrants as opposed to legal migrants, given that statistically, illegal migration accounts for no more than 50 percent of all migration worldwide. The argument that undocumented migration is a very serious security problem in Nigeria [24], is weakened by the view of [25] and [26], who argue otherwise, positing that illegal migration need not be considered a security problem if it is properly handled.

Theoretical Framework

The link between migration and trans-network of insurgency and crime will be explained using the migrant control framework derived from Everett Lee's *Theory of Migration*. The migrant control framework is synthesized from a combination of ideas centering on the securitization of migration by states, with regard to the *push and pull* factors of migration, by means of the political *intervening obstacles* of international border controls and immigration restrictions identified in Lee's migration theory.

There is no single general theory of migration, but several approaches seeking to explain why people migrate have been derived from the *push and pull factors* model. The *push and pull* concept of migration was first advanced by Ernst Ravenstein in 1885. Ravenstein who is generally regarded as the earliest migration theorist, used census data from England and Wales in the 19th century to develop his *Laws of Migration* in which he concluded that migration was governed by a "push-pull" process directly related to better economic opportunity whereby unfavorable conditions in one place "push" people out, and favorable conditions in an external location "pull" people out. He theorized that every migrant flow generates a counter-migration; that improvements in transport lead to greater volumes of migration; that economic motives are the main stimulus for migration; and that while

migration is generally beneficial to receiving states, illegal migration is a threat to the country. Ravenstein's theory has remained relevant and subsequent migration models such as the neoclassical economic theory and the World Systems theory have been based on the push-pull model.

However, [27] reformulated Ravenstein's "push-pull" theory to include non-economic push factors that included climate, family ties and quality of education. His significant contribution to this theory however, is his inclusion of what he termed *intervening obstacles* such as physical distance, cost of making the journey, cultural barriers, and political obstacles like international borders and immigration restrictions which have to be overcome. He postulated that volume of migration is directly related to difficulty in surmounting intervening obstacles, and that unless severe checks or migrant controls are imposed, both the volume and the rate of migration tend to increase over time.

Push dynamics of migration have been identified by various scholars to include political factors such as conflict, political instability, war and persecution [28]; economic factors such as unemployment, poor wages and rising cost of living [29]: [30]; [31]; and environmental factors such as climate change, natural disasters, famine, drought and dwindling natural

resources [32]. In the same way, pull factors of migration correspond to political, economic or environmental dynamics such as higher wages, better employment, political stability, better climatic conditions and availability of resources.

Migrant control framework consists of ideas and concepts seeking to explain the behavior of states with respect to the securitization of migration, and seeks to explain the link between migration and national security. Its major suppositions are as follows:

- That states are disposed to address the challenge posed by international migration to their national security, specifically to their ability to regulate the movement of people across their borders [33], by means of border security and immigration control policies.
- That the volume of migration is directly related to the difficulty in surmounting intervening obstacles, and that unless severe checks are imposed, both the volume and the rate of migration tend to increase over time [34];
- That migration as a security issue cannot be managed on a unilateral basis by individual destination states, but

requires meaningful cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination [35];

- That states formulate immigration policies to encourage some forms of border crossing and not others;
- That illegal migration is a threat to national security, and uncontrolled migrant flows across borders produce additional stresses on already weak state institutions, heighten competition over scarce resources, and exacerbate ethnic and sectarian tensions [36].
- That even though states possess extensive authority to control the entrance of immigrants into their territories, they are generally unsuccessful in controlling illegal immigration [37].

The migrant control framework assumes that international movements are highly susceptible to political and administrative controls and views national legislation, administrative decisions, immigration reforms and trans-border cooperation as the most recognizable policy responses of migration control. It posits that the general impact of migration on national security therefore depends on the efficacy of a particular state's policy to shape migration flows according to its overall national interests.

Illegal Border Routes and Boko Haram Attacks in Northeast Nigeria

The cohesiveness and expansiveness of transnational networks is mainly responsible for the unending flow of cross-border migration into and out of northeast Nigeria. This chapter examined the relationship between illegal border routes and Boko Haram attacks in Northeast Nigeria. Specifically, it investigated the

relationship between transnational network and cross-border settlement in Northeast Nigeria, the Incidence of illegal migration in northeast Nigeria and the impact of illegal border crossing on Boko Haram attacks in northeast Nigeria.

Transnational Network and Cross-Border Settlement in Northeast Nigeria

According to [38], cross-border migration is better classified as transnational migration when the migration process involves participating simultaneously in social relations that embed the migrants in more than one nation-state, blurring the distinction between countries of origin and destination. Transnationalism alludes more to the maintenance and preservation of links or networks across borders as opposed to merely cross-border flows. It is

precisely and primarily the existence of these transnational networks that drives and sustains the permanent cross-border migration flows that occur into northeast Nigeria. As a result of these shared religious and cultural experiences, cross-border flows between and among the various peoples of the borderlands have always been considered normal, legitimate and essential, and over time have crystallized into expansive networks. The

cohesiveness and expansiveness of these transnational networks is mainly responsible for the unending flow of cross-border migration into and out of northeast Nigeria.

Before the advent of the modern state system, the people of northeast Nigeria who shared religious and cultural affinities moved freely among themselves and across community boundaries with little or no hindrance. Religion, trade and family alliances were the driving forces of their movements. Migration therefore, was not particularly viewed by the people as a security threat, but as an integral aspect of the life stream of economic and cultural integration. However, the British colonization of Nigeria changed the dynamics of movement in the old Kanem Borno Empire, which saw significant parts of its territory partitioned. The 19th Century scramble for Africa led to the division of much of the Borno Empire between Britain and Germany, with Britain claiming its territory as the British Cameroons. These territorial dissections signaled political, economic and administrative spheres of influence marked by territorial boundaries. Thus, northeastern Nigeria became separated from the non-British territories of Cameroun, Chad and Niger by 1,800 kilometers of border that cut through mountain ranges, thick rainforests and Sahel desert. These boundaries, defined in terms of latitudes, longitudes, geometric circles and straight lines, split several ethnic and cultural communities [39]. As noted by [40], this delineation created several communities on both sides of the border, but did little to change the pattern of social, cultural and economic movement between and among these communities. There are presently, a total of 1,095 border communities in northeast Nigeria, with Borno having by far the largest number, followed by Adamawa. The large number of

border communities is suggestive of the frequent and steady flows between communities on both sides. Most of these communities have very ancient cultural and commercial ties with communities and peoples on the opposite side of the border [41].

However, migration flows in northeast Nigeria were stimulated by more than commercial considerations, and became more entrenched with the advent of military alliances and intermarriages between powerful families. The predominance of Islam and the establishment of Maiduguri as a religious and cultural center of excellence also gave rise to influxes of migrants from far and wide in search of religious education. These economic, social and religious dynamics formed the predominant nature of migration flows in a region peopled by the *Balewa, Babur, Hausa, Fulani, Baggara, Mumuye, Tangalawaja* and *Kanuri* ethnic groups. Another major feature of migration flows within the region now known as northeast Nigeria was the transhumant movement of the Fulani pastoralists across the *Sahel*, instigated in part by the continued advancement of the Sahara, a phenomenon which forced the relocation of many pastoral communities toward the more fertile lands of Bornu [42].

The colonialization of Nigeria and its subsequent recognition as a sovereign entity with all the legal attributes of a modern state under international law had implications for cross-border migration. For instance, the impositions of territorial boundaries administered in accordance to the principles of state sovereignty meant that historical migration patterns between communities that had hitherto been mostly unhindered now became subject to official political protocols of border controls and immigration restrictions.

Table 1: Dominant Transnational Ethno/Religious Cultures in Northeast Nigeria

People Culture Religion / /	Area of Predominance in Northeast Nigeria	Population in Nigeria	Population in Chad	Population in Niger	Population in Cameroun
Kanuri / Islam	Borno, Yobe	6,980,000	1,100,000	850,000	56,000
Fulani / Islam	Adamawa, Bauchi	7,000,000	128,000	1,500,000	700,000
Baggara (Shuwa Arab) / Islam	Borno	289,000	2,391,000	150,000	171,000
Hausa / Islam	Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba	67,000,000	462,000	11,000,000	556,000

Source: Culled from Egonu (2017: p) "Cross Border Migration and National Security in Northeast Nigeria, 2009-2015" *Doctoral Thesis*, Department of Political Science, UNN.

The above table shows the major peoples and cultures with historically entrenched transnational networks that span Niger, Chad Cameroun and Nigeria. The significant population figures of the major ethno-religious communities occurring on various sides of the borders is a clear indication that the delineation of "official" borders through this region only served to draw an imaginary line between peoples that are more or less culturally homogenous. Despite periodic conflicts over political supremacy, the dominant *Hausa*, *Fulani* and *Kanuri* populations have intermarried and interacted for several generations, forming bonds and connections that are firmly cemented by the uniting force of the Islamic religion and culture. It is significant that Islam as a culture has been predominant in the region of northern Africa, spreading down into northern Nigeria and the countries adjoining the borderlands of Nigeria's northeast. This accounts for the continued flourishing of transnational networks of trade and family ties across the formal territorial borders. This establishes the reality of the existence in northeast Nigeria, of transnational socio-cultural fields that transcend the frontiers of the

national borders. These transnational social fields are in many ways defined by a set of social expectations, cultural values, and patterns of human interaction shaped by more than one social, economic and political system [43].

Since transnational social fields transcend the boundaries of nation-states, the everyday activities and relationships of the individuals within these fields are subject to various laws and institutions that exist within these states once they cross into their borders [44]. This means that cross-border flows, and indeed transnational networks, regardless of their cultural or historical antecedents, are subject to the institutional regulations and controls of border and immigration regimes. As noted by [7], beyond conferring on modern states the right to control their territories, the doctrine of state sovereignty imposes upon them the very obligation to do so. The ability to govern a territory and guarantee territorial integrity is one of the defining characteristic of a sovereign state. Thus, cross-border flows that disregard national boundaries and legal restrictions are therefore considered illegal.

The Incidence of Illegal Migration in Northeast Nigeria

Illegal migration may take several forms, depending on the country and its laws. Illegal immigration generally refers to the migration of people across national borders in a way that violates the immigration laws of the originating, transit or destination country. There are three major forms of illegal migration. They include undocumented entry, entry through false

or fraudulent documents, and violators of entry visa duration. Undocumented migrants refer to those nationals of one state that enter another state surreptitiously, without the required inspection and documentation by the relevant immigration authorities. This category of migrants usually gain entry through unofficial border crossings at

porous sections of the border, either to evade detection, or simply because it is more convenient to do so. This is often the case with migrants who, as a course of regular routine, follow the traditional migration routes of long-standing and well entrenched transnational networks between and through affiliated borderland communities on either side of national borders. This sort of migration, though occurring outside the regulatory norms of the destination state, is more often classified as *irregular* rather than illegal, because the term more accurately describes the situation of asylum seekers and refugees as well as other every day informal social and commercial flows. It also applies to violators of the terms and conditions of entry visas who have overstayed their duration and any other person not authorized to remain in the host country (*International Organization for Migration, 2013*).

Migrants who gain entry with fraudulent documents are considered properly illegal and probably criminal in intent since this sort of entry usually entails the falsification of identities and stated mission. This involves contact with immigration authorities often because strict border controls or forbidding terrain prevent entry through unofficial points.

Illegal immigration in northeast Nigeria occurs through hundreds of unmanned routes along the 1,800 kilometers of border shared with Cameroun, Chad and Niger. Because of the cultural and historical dynamics that link the *Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Baggara* and other communities of the northeastern borderlands, irregular cross-border flows of people and goods has become a normal fact of daily life along the borders.

However, since 2009, growing concerns over the rising incidence of terrorism have

Table 2: Apprehension /Deportation of illegal Migrants in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno and Yobe States, 2009-2015

State	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Adamawa	1	0	0	86	426	233	280	1026
Bauchi	0	0	95	65	32	80	43	315
Borno	39	56	942	138	1238	-	-	2413
Yobe	11	1	22	1046	816	89	-	1985
Total	51	57	1059	1335	2512	402	323	5739

Source: Report of the Nigerian Immigration Service for the Selected Years

drawn greater attention to the security implications of irregular cross-border flows at the northeastern borders. The militant Islamist group *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), also known as *Boko Haram*, has created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in northeastern Nigeria in particular, and the entire country in general. The insurgence of this group has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and millions of naira worth of property and the porosity of the borders due to their expanse and the nature of the terrain have long been suspected in aiding terrorist influxes. The *modus operandi* of the group which involves attacking government and civilian targets and then retreating to remote locations within Nigeria and the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroun, coupled with the existence of *Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM), lends credibility to the assertion of illegal foreign involvement in the terrorism in northeast Nigeria. The rise in the incidence of illegal migration in northeast Nigeria since 2009 is evidenced by the rise in apprehension and deportation of illegal migrants by the Nigerian Immigration Service in the northeastern states of *Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba* and *Yobe*. It is significant that due to the very nature of illegal migration, obtaining accurate statistics on the exact number of illegal migrants is very difficult, and where it is obtained, the figures from various sources are often disparate due to a particular emphasis on one of the various categorizations of illegal migration. However, for purposes of reliability, data on illegal migration in Nigeria are obtainable from the official records of government agencies like the Nigerian Immigration Service, and Non-Governmental Organizations like the *International Organization for Migration*.

The analysis of available data in Table above shows that the combined figures for deportation of illegal migrants in four of the six northeastern states of Nigeria between 2009 and 2010 stood at 5,739. Records for Gombe and Taraba States are not available. It is observed that within this period, illegal migration witnessed significant increases across the northeast. As at 2015, apprehension and deportation of illegal migrants stood at 533 per cent higher than at 2009, with levels peaking between 2011 and 2013. It is also observed

The Impact of Illegal Border Crossing on Boko Haram Attacks in Northeast Nigeria

The escalation in both illegal migration and terrorism in northeast Nigeria have been established. The rise in the influx of illegal migrants between 2009 and 2015 coincides with the escalation of terrorist attacks within the same period. The involvement of illegal migrants in terror activities in Nigeria is well attested. Violent crimes such as armed robbery, car theft and smuggling in northeastern border regions are strongly attributed to the presence of illegal immigrants from the neighboring countries of Niger and Chad. Since 2009, growing national and international concerns have arisen over the rising incidence of terrorism in northeastern Nigeria. The militant Islamist group *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the

group was not a Nigerian. Mohammed Yusuf's second in command was a Nigerian national named Kilakam, who on two occasions was arrested and repatriated to his country [45]. Similarly, it has been pointed out that documents and personal items discovered on the corpses of dead Boko Haram fighters by the Nigerian Army in Borno State show that many of them are not Nigerians and appear to come from the neighboring countries of Chad and Niger Republic [46]. According to [8], Borno State Immigration authorities confirm the influx of foreign elements to join the *Nigerian Taliban* from the neighboring Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroun, stating that most of the arrested suspects of the religious sect were Nigerian citizens.

Statements by Nigeria's *Director of Defence Information* claim that a *Boko Haram* leader was arrested in Niger. The statement claimed that the intention of the sect

that states with border communities show significantly higher rates of illegal migrant apprehensions. Bauchi State which has no border communities recorded 315 deportations, while Adamawa, Borno and Yobe which harbor a combined total of 929 border communities recorded 1,026, 2,413 and 1,985 deportations respectively. These figures support the assertion that illegal cross-border migration into northeast Nigeria recorded significant increases within the period under study.

Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), also known as *Boko Haram*, has created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in northeastern Nigeria in particular, and the entire country in general. The insurgence of this group has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and millions of naira worth of property. The guerilla-style *modus operandi* of the group involves violent and deadly attacks against government and civilian targets and then retreating to remote locations within Nigeria and the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroun. More recently however, growing evidence has established the link between illegal migrants and terrorism in northeast Nigeria. *Boko Haram* was formerly called the *Nigerian Taliban*. It is significant that the second highest ranking leader of the

leader and those arrested with him was to rearm from Niger Republic, recruit new fighters and train them for renewed terrorist activities in Nigeria [47]. Also, the involvement of foreign militias from Somalia, Chad, Sudan and other Islamic countries in Boko Haram attacks in northeast Nigeria around the fringes of Lake Chad Basin and in cities like *Gashua*, *Dikwa*, *Mubi*, *Gembu*, *Damaturu* and *Maiduguri* are confirmed by Local media reports of assailants who speak languages unknown in Nigeria [48].

Illegal transnational border routes in northeast Nigeria have provided *Boko Haram* the opportunity to recruit manpower in transit from among the local population. Much of the 38 per cent of Nigerian emigration that flows to Nigeria is illegal, and this would equally account for the large number of non-Nigerian nationals

suspected to be among the ranks of *Boko Haram*.

Table 3: Summary of Crimes by Immigrants in Nigeria, 2009 - 2013

Offence	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Murder	14	10	12	21	36
Attempted Murder	2	6	2	7	13
Slave Dealing/Human Trafficking	21	11	45	17	18
Rape/Indecent Assault	1	5	2	0	2
Kidnaping	0	2	3	0	10
Armed Robbery	21	18	28	20	34
Theft/Other Stealing	42	29	46	35	124
Burglary	28	36	23	26	27
Smuggling	146	87	122	131	289
Arms Trafficking	11	2	75	115	202
Forgery of Currency Note	36	124	101	70	74
Escape from Lawful Custody	0	2	12	29	72
Others	47	96	57	166	122
	369	428	528	637	1023

Source: Nigeria Police Headquarters, Abuja, 2014

From Table 3 above, it is observed that between 2009 and 2013, the total number of crimes committed by immigrants increased by 177 per cent from 369 to 1,023. This significant increase is one of the factors responsible for the enactment of Nigeria's *Immigration Act, 2015*, which securitizes cross-border migration by establishing a *Directorate of Border Patrol* charged amongst other things with controlling terrorism and other cross-border crimes. Reports of illegal immigrants engaged in illegal activity in northern Nigeria reinforce the argument that illegal migrants constitute a security risk. Between January and November 2014,

the *Nigerian Immigration Service* arrested and repatriated 430 illegal migrants caught in possession of *Nigerian Voters Cards*. 90 percent of the arrested immigrants were from Niger Republic while the others were from Cameroun, Chad and Mali [7].

We demonstrated in this chapter that existence of unmanned border routes stimulated the proliferation of Boko Haram attacks in northeast Nigeria. Relevant tables and figures to support our findings were also presented. Thus, we upheld our first hypothesis that the existence of unmanned border routes stimulated the proliferation of Boko Haram attacks.

COUNTER INSURGENCY COOPERATION AND WEAPONS' PROLIFERATION IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA

A nation's borders are the physical geographical boundaries of its political and administrative jurisdiction, within which its security, integrity and independence are maintained. It is one of the hallmarks of national sovereignty. Illegal crossing of people and goods across a nation's border is therefore regarded as a violation of territorial integrity and a security breach in all nations of the world. This chapter

examined counter insurgency cooperation and weapons' proliferation in northeast Nigeria. Specifically, it evaluated border security mechanisms in Nigeria, trans-border counter insurgency cooperation between Nigeria and neighbouring states and the link between poor enforcement of counter insurgency agreements and proliferation of weapons in northeast Nigeria.

Border Security Mechanisms in Nigeria

The legal and institutional frameworks for border management in Nigeria are manifested in the enactment of laws and the establishment of agencies of government charged with various aspects of border control. Even though the length of Nigeria’s borders, as well as the terrain and topography of the border areas present difficulties for monitoring and patrol, the porosity of Nigeria’s borders is equally due to the nature of the border control regime.

It is important to note that a nation’s borders are the physical geographical boundaries of its political and administrative jurisdiction, within which its security, integrity and independence are maintained. It is one of the hallmarks of national sovereignty. Illegal crossing of people and goods across a nation’s border is therefore regarded as a violation of territorial integrity and a security breach in all nations of the world. According to [7], the colonial delineation of Nigeria’s borders resulted in 4,060 kilometers of political-administrative boundaries that are difficult to reconcile with the realities of the historical and socio-cultural experience of the local peoples. These boundaries, motivated by political and economic interests, traverse diverse geographical terrains including mountain ranges, equatorial rainforests, savannah and desert, and have split several ethnic and cultural communities. However, because these boundaries are largely perceived by the local populations they divide as being artificial and imaginary lines, they are largely ignored and disregarded in favor of

historical, socio-cultural community routes and boundaries. According to [20], ethnic or economic ties existed before the borders were imposed and the local communities have often maintained formal and informal cross-border cooperation in a variety of areas, irrespective of the existence of a political border. Consistent with the postulations of the migrant control framework, the Nigerian government has permitted much of such irregular movement across and into its border communities, viewing it more as culturally necessary and economically expedient than overtly criminal.

Even though borders can never be completely controlled, they can be efficiently managed in cooperation with neighboring states and in accordance with geographical considerations, available resources and ethnic realities [49]. Efficient border management requires a definition by political authorities as to what constitutes a threat to their security and what should be prioritized as concerns for border control and monitoring [50]. Consequently, the agencies and resources designated for border management depend on the political priorities of the government. In Nigeria, the securitization of border management is evident in the nature of the main institutional agents vested with the responsibility for border control. The sheer length and diversity of terrain of Nigeria’s borders requires the combined effort of several different agencies specializing in different aspects of border control.

Trans-Border Counter Insurgency Cooperation between Nigeria and Neighbouring States

There is a consistent rise in numbers of reported trans-border crimes, with most of them been violent crimes. The implication of this is that illicit trade in arms in

Nigeria; particularly its northern borders has increased and become a major security threat to nation and its neighbouring states.

Table 4: Estimate of SALW in Circulation by the End of 2014 (Licit and Illicit)

Estimate of SALW in Circulation Globally	Estimate of SALW in Circulation Africa	Estimate of SALW in Circulation Sub Saharan Africa	Estimate of SALW in Circulation West Africa	Estimate of SALW in Circulation Nigeria
640 million	100 million	30 million	10 million	7 million

Source: Compiled by the Researcher from the 2014

Small Arms Survey Report

The table above shows the worrisome situation in Nigeria. One-third of the SALW circulating in sub-Saharan Africa are located in the West Africa. Also, Nigeria’s contribution is quite noticeable as it account for 70 percent of all SALW found in the sub region. This situation, according to

UNODC and Small Arms Survey reports of 2014 is worrisome because most of these arms end up in ‘wrong’ hands. Global trade in small arms is estimated to worth about *US\$4 billion* annually and at least a quarter of it is associated with unauthorized or illicit transactions in arms [6].

Table 5: Annual Estimate of Trade in SALW (US\$)

Global Estimate of Trade in SALW	Estimate of Unauthorized Trade in SALW	Estimate of Unauthorized Trade in SALW in Nigeria	Nigeria’s % of Unauthorized Trade in SALW
4 billion	1 billion	170.1 million	17.1 %

Source: Compiled by the Researcher from 2016 Small Arms Survey Report

The table above shows that the Nigeria accounts for over 17 percent of illicit transaction in small arms annually by the end of 2016. In fact, most transactions in SALW in the country are illicit. Unauthorized transactions in SALW in Nigeria involve both trade in locally manufactured SALW and imported SALW. Some of the locally manufactured SALW traded in the Nigeria include pocket single-

shot gun, four-shot revolver, eight-shot revolver, single-barrel shotgun, horizontal double-barrel shotgun and vertical double-barrel shotgun [6]. Examples of imported SALW traded in the Nigeria include *rocket launchers, missiles systems, light machine guns, revolvers* and *pistols with automatic loading*. Most of the weapons used by sophisticated criminal groups like Boko Haram are imported SALW.

Table 6: Major Routes of Impounded Illicit Arms in West Africa between 2010 and 2014

Routes	Percentage
Land Borders	57.6
Sea Borders	31.4
Air Trips	4
Unconfirmed	7

Source: UNODC (2013). *Transnational Organized crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*. Vienna: UNODC.

While illegal trans-border sale of arms in West Africa has no doubt reached an alarming rate, the above table shows that all transnational borders in the sub region are being exploited by criminal gangs to perpetuate this crime, particularly land borders that are characterized by poor and ineffective management.

control framework of this study, recognition of the fact that cross-border weapons flows cannot be effectively controlled by unilateral mechanisms necessitated the establishment of trans-border arrangements with Nigeria’s neighbors. Thus, the framework for the control of SALW in Nigeria incorporates multilateral and bilateral arrangements which Nigeria has entered into with its neighbors to boost cross-border cooperation and enhance border security. These include the establishment of various joint commissions and committees with Benin, Chad, Niger and Cameroon as well as the formation of a *Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)* in recognition of the fact that

The of susceptibility Nigeria’s borders to the infiltration of SALW is due partly to circumstances of geography. The extensive land borders to the East, West and North, and the considerably long coastline to the South, provide easy entry points for the smuggling of arms into the country. In line with the propositions of the migrant

the proliferation of SALW and other cross-border security issues cannot be controlled unilaterally, but require cooperation from other states, in this case Nigeria's proximal border neighbors of Niger, Chad and Cameroon and Benin.

Nigeria's security relations with Benin are centered on military cooperation and trans-border issues. The two neighbors witnessed a series of border clashes in 1969 and have both experienced criminal activities along their mutual border. However, growing cooperation between both countries has led to the signing of several bilateral agreements with implication for border security. They include the *Memorandum of Understanding on Joint Police Border Patrol*, 2001; *Cooperation Agreement to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons*, 2005; and the *Nigeria Customs Service/Customs Administration of Benin bilateral Agreement* of 2015. The overall objective of these agreements has been to form a common front against trafficking, provide joint security surveillance and border patrols, prevention of the movement of illicit SALW and the sharing of intelligence.

Trans-border relations between Nigeria and Chad were once characterized by tension and the prospect of an escalated armed confrontation owing to the ambiguities of border delineation and demarcation that led to frequent border clashes. In 1983, Chadian forces made incursions into Nigerian territory in the Lake Chad region, overrunning several Nigerian islands on the lake. They were forced to withdraw by the Nigerian Army detachments in *Baye* and *Doro* on the shores of the lake, with reinforcements from the Army's *3rd Division* and *23rd Armorial* based in *Maiduguri*. This led to the militarization and temporary closure of the border with Chad, and the construction of an all-weather highway from *Baye* to *Doro* to facilitate rapid troop movements in the future. Tensions were de-escalated temporarily by an agreement to revive joint border patrols which had been discontinued due to border hostilities, and to have the *Lake Chad Basin Commission* (LCBC) which was created in 1964 by the four countries bordering Lake Chad-Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria mediate on further border security issues through a

special *Joint Commission on Border Demarcation* [11].

More recently however, due to growing concerns over cross-border terrorism, human trafficking and weapons smuggling, Nigeria and Chad signed a low profile Trans-border Security Pact in 2009 and a *Memorandum of Understanding on Counter-Terrorism* in 2014 [5]. The objectives of the pact include collaboration between their military, customs and immigration agencies to check trans-border crimes, manage refugee and demarcation problems and the undertaking of trans-border security workshops [12].

Nigeria-Cameroon border relations have been characterized by a mixture of tension, hostility and diplomacy. Both countries signed a *Memorandum of Understanding on the Control of Movement of Persons and Goods* in February, 1963; the *Agreement on Police Cooperation* in March, 1972; However, a series of incidents involving Cameroonian aggression over territorial claims, and the activities of pirates and smugglers operating along the borders provoked military tension along the Nigeria - Cameroon border in the 1980s. In 1981, a Cameroonian patrol boat opened fire on a Nigerian vessel, killing five Nigerian soldiers and wounding three. In 1987, Cameroonian Forces occupied 16 border communities in Borno state, provoking a military response from Nigeria which eventually saw them expelled. In 1989, Cameroonian soldiers abducted four Nigerian Customs officers on routine patrol along the border. Tensions became most evident over rival claims to the *Bakassi Peninsula*, which saw the heavy deployment of military forces on both sides, an indication that oil politics had elevated tensions in the southern border above those of the northern stretch [14].

However, after the peaceful resolution of the *Bakassi* affair, and due to growing concerns over the transnational nature of *Boko Haram's* terrorist activities, Nigeria and Cameroon have sought deeper security cooperation on border issues, evident in the signing of a Border Security Agreement and the establishment of a Cameroon-Nigeria *Trans Border Security Committee* (CST) on 28th February 2012 in Abuja [51]. The border security agreement emphasized

joint border patrols and a single unified Command along the border. The *Border Security Committee* was instituted to develop practicable strategies and measures to strengthen cooperation on border security, and new measures to address terrorism, smuggling of SALW and illegal migration [52].

Border relations between Nigeria and Niger have traditionally been characterized by free cross-border flows owing to the religious and ethno-cultural affinity between the peoples of northern Nigeria and those of southern Niger. This led to a practice of eased security restrictions. However, large influxes of irregular migrants, and more recently *Boko Haram* terrorists and SALW, have led to a heightened security concerns over the porosity of the border. Bilateral border security cooperation between Nigeria and Niger is exemplified by the signing of a *Bilateral Defence Agreement* on 18th October, 2012 in Niamey and the ratification by the Nigerian government on 14th August, 2013 in Abuja. The agreement is centered on providing mutual military support and security for common borders; closer cooperation in sharing and training activities, and cooperation on cross-border terrorism, border demarcation and construction of roads and railways [12]. Both countries also agreed to equip their national boundary commissions with the necessary logistical support to ensure the quick demarcation of the boundary.

Poor Enforcement of Counter Insurgency Agreements and Proliferation of Weapons in Northeast Nigeria

Northeast Nigeria has witnessed alarming escalations in the proliferation of SALW, which is the deadly component that gives the biting edge to terrorism. Transborder security arrangements have been put in place by Nigeria and her neighbors to arrest the growing insecurity in northeast Nigeria, which has spilled over into southern Niger, northern Cameroon and southern Chad. However, the enforcement of trans-border security mechanisms is largely dependent on the effectiveness of the domestic agencies entrusted with border security. The weakness of these agencies in Nigeria impinges directly on the enforcement of trans-border security arrangements that have as a key objective,

Nigeria's multilateral trans-border security cooperation is manifested in its involvement in the *Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)*, a regional security mechanism established by the *Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)* countries of Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria, and non-member Benin. The *MNJTF* was formed as an offensive and stabilization mechanism primarily to combat *Boko Haram* and other terrorists groups operating within the Lake Chad Basin. Though the force was first organized in 1994, incorporating Nigeria, Niger and Chad, its establishment and current structure were determined by the *LCBC* heads of state and government on 7th October 2014. It was endorsed by the *African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC)* on 25th November 2014, and was fully authorized for a 12-month deployment on 29th January 2015. The mandate of the *MNJTF* includes creating a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of *Boko Haram* and other terrorist groups within the *LCBC* area; facilitating the full restoration of state authority and the return of *Internally Displaced People (IDPs)* and refugees in the affected areas; facilitating humanitarian operations, and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations; conducting patrols; preventing all transfers of weapons or logistics to the group; search and rescue of all abductees; and carrying out psychological operations to encourage defection within *Boko Haram's* ranks.

the prevention of cross-border flows of SALW.

The weakness of border security has been acknowledged as a major factor in the insecurity in northeast Nigeria. According to the *ECOWAS* Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the proliferation of arms in northern Nigeria and the *Sahel* is aggravated by the "deficiency in enforcement capacity of security forces to control and stem the tide of the easy supply of illicit weapons" [16].

According to the *Principles for Cross-border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions*, published by the *Financial Stability Board*

(FSB), governments are required to take supportive measures to ensure the effective implementation of cross-border agreements. Supportive measures are defined as the taking of resolutions or other measures by the relevant domestic authorities to produce the effect of, or otherwise support, the resolution action taken by the foreign resolution authority [5]. The implication of this is that states are responsible for taking domestic actions to ensure the effective implementation of trans-border commitments. This highlights the need for governments to strengthen existing systems, as well as to create innovative new mechanisms in order to promote the border cooperation and planning under asymmetrical conditions, as noted by [3]. Strengthening existing systems would necessarily entail supporting border cooperation through tangible and substantial commitment to funding, training and equipping the border security agencies as well as the agencies responsible for the development of the border communities. The importance of border communities in the trans-border

security equation has been noted by scholars who argue that effective border cooperation requires governments to address the needs and grievances of border communities which are often politically, socially and economically marginalized [20].

The weakness in the enforcement of Nigeria's trans-border security agreements arises from the institutional weaknesses inherent in the border security agencies, as well as from the overall coordination of security operations. According to [7], issues such as the over-deployment of the Nigerian military for internal security operations, the paucity of border security personnel, inadequate funding and poor equipment and facilities plague the Nigerian border enforcement architecture, while unresolved boundary disputes, official inertia, lack of cooperation and mutual distrust have impeded the effectiveness of joint trans-border operations. This state of affairs is attested to by official records and independent media reports.

Unresolved boundary disputes

According to [13], the first manifestation of inter-agency conflict arises over the problem of boundary demarcation. The unambiguous demarcation of sovereign territory is prerequisite for avoiding clashes over jurisdiction during the implementation or enforcement of trans-border security agreements. However, the incomplete demarcation of Nigeria's territorial boundaries has created a border security problem. While Nigeria's western and northwestern borders are fairly well demarcated and require only minor adjustments, several portions of the northeastern borders with Cameroun and Chad are poorly demarcated and remain sources of contention between Nigeria her northeastern neighbors.

Agency disagreements over the northeastern boundaries are evident in the allegations against the Cameroonian authorities "inordinate attempt to remove or destroy pillars, carry off stones and sometimes take over any space created by the change in the water course from its original boundary position into Nigeria" [13]. This sparked disagreements with the Cameroonian boundary authorities, with Nigeria insisting that the boundary line remains, irrespective of the course of the river, and maintaining that the area created by the new course naturally belongs to Nigeria. These sorts of ongoing boundary disputes are evident at the *Gamboru-Ngala* border with Chad; *Banki-Bama*, *Kumshe*, *Ganye*, *Mubi*, *Fufore*, *Toungo* and *Maiha* borders with Cameroun, and *Damasak* and *Bosso* borders with Niger, and undermine cross-border agency cooperation in enforcing trans-border security agreements, by creating confusion over spheres of influence in the event of joint border patrols.

Paucity of border security personnel

The insufficient number of border security personnel is exemplified by official records of the *Nigeria Immigration Service* showing the total staff strength as 22,320 personnel (see Table 5.3). This number is grossly inadequate, considering the vastness of Nigeria's border, the number of entry

points, and the fact that only about 1000 officers were deployed into the *Special Border Patrol Corps* established in 2014 [14]. Also, the disclosure by the *Comptroller-General* of the NIS that the manpower needs would require an additional 5000 new staff yearly, over the

next 5 years is indicative of the fact. However, administrative and organizational inefficiencies within the NIS were highlighted when a staff recruitment exercise on March 15, 2014 ended in disaster, leaving 15 applicants dead, and several others injured in a stampede during the exercise [6].

Similarly, the Nigerian Army's *Chief of Army Staff* (COAS) has disclosed that the

Over-deployment of the Nigerian military for internal security operations

This fact was captured by a *Communiqué on Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria* attended by participants from *Office of the National Security Adviser*, the *Nigeria Police Force*, and the *National Boundaries Commission*, to the effect that "the default position of deployment of the military for internal security operations has kept the military continually engaged in internal law-enforcement thereby

contemporary national security needs and Nigeria's territorial size require more than what the army presently has in terms of personnel strength, and would need to increase its numerical strength from its current 100,000 to slightly above 200,000 personnel over the next eight years [8]. The numerical insufficiency of the Army impedes the capacity of the state to enforce trans-border security agreements.

contributing to the weakening of the law-enforcement capacity of the police" (CLEEN Foundation, 2015). The law enforcement capacity of the police includes the effectiveness of its *Border Patrol Unit* to enforce the requirements of the 2001 *MoU on Joint Police Border Patrol* with Benin, and the 1972 *Agreement on Police Cooperation* with Cameroon, and several other joint border patrol obligations [6].

Inadequate funding

As stated earlier, effective border cooperation requires addressing the needs and grievances of border communities which are often politically, socially and economically marginalized. The relevance of this to the proliferation of SALW is further captured by Cohen, Mills & McKay (2016), who argue that the collapse of the Libyan state led to an increase in the availability of illicit weapons that find their way via smuggling networks into marginalized border areas where they are easily co-opted by heavily armed opportunistic groups [16]. This underscores the importance of developing the border communities as a means of facilitating and strengthening trans-border cooperate. In Nigeria, such mandate and authority rests primarily with the *Border*

Communities Development Agency (BCDA). An analysis of periodic budgetary allocations to the BCDA from 2009 to 2015 reveals a trend over the years whereby allocations for capital expenditure, and consequently development projects, have been shrinking.

The effectiveness of any development agency in the execution of infrastructure and human development projects is largely dependent on the quality and level of funding available to it. The shrinking of capital allocations for a border development agency that is mandated to oversee the development of 2,477 border communities around the country, with 1,095 of them in the northeast (see Table 5.2) is an indication of poor funding.

Issues of government inertia

The issue of inertia in the enforcement of trans-border security agreements is highlighted by the lack of urgency with which the Nigerian government approaches its bilateral engagements concerning the security situation in the northeast. For instance, the Nigeria-Niger *Bilateral Defence Agreement* which was signed on 18th October, 2012 was only ratified on 14th August, 2013. Despite the escalating levels of insecurity in northeast Nigeria, it took the *Federal Executive Council* ten months to grant official assent to a trans-border

agreement designed to curb terrorism and the flow of SALW by securing the borders [19].

Similarly, the Nigeria-Cameroon border security agreement was signed on 12th February, 2012. A year later, In April 2013, during the 31st Session of the *Nigeria-Cameroon Mixed Commission*, Nigeria's *Attorney General* called for expedited action on the border security agreement, with emphasis on joint border patrols and a unified command along the borders

(*National Boundary Commission*, 2015). However, two years later, despite the escalating insecurity along the shared borders, very little had been done. The joint Communiqué of the 4th Session of the *Cameroon-Nigeria Transborder Security Committee* which held in November 2015, called on both parties to facilitate the signing of the various agreements and *MoU* on trans-border crime, including the *Draft Agreement on Proliferation of SALW*. The Communiqué also urged both parties to organize joint training exercises for border security personnel (*News Agency of Nigeria*, November 21, 2015). The implication of this is that despite the urgency of the security situation affecting both countries, they had been at the level of conferences

Lack of cooperation and mutual distrust

Though the effective implementation of trans-border agreements can be limited by differences in developmental levels and governmental structures, cooperation between states is indispensable. According to [11], coordinated border management entails coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security. It has been argued and cited by many law enforcement officials that dealing with a variety of cross-border issues requires the existence of effective liaison mechanisms between different agencies and jurisdictions [3]. Lack of cooperation and mutual distrust in the enforcement of trans-border security agreements between Nigeria and her neighbors is evident from a number of independent media reports on incidents involving the operations of the *MNJTF*. It is reported that officials from Chad, Niger and Cameroon have consistently complained about Nigeria's lack of cooperation with regards to the regional task force to fight *Boko Haram*. According to the *Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention* (PNCP), since the inception of the *MNJTF*, Nigeria has either "diplomatically boycotted the initiative, or maneuvered to ensure it would remain in the driver's seat of any military endeavor" [5]. In early January 2015, Chadian troops overran a *Boko Haram* camp in the Nigerian town of *Gamboru* along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, and were pressing deeper into Nigerian territory in pursuit of the terrorists. This was in accordance with the "*right of hot pursuit*" granted to Chad under a bilateral military agreement, and

and meetings for three years without any concrete action, particularly as it relates to the flow of SALW across their shared border. Inertia in the enforcement of trans-border security is also evident from the onset of the *MNJTF*. On 7th October 2014, the leaders of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin, the *LCBC* countries faced with the *Boko Haram* insurgency met in Niamey to discuss modalities for the deployment of the *MNJTF* and the establishment of its command headquarters. The decision was made to deploy their respective national contingents by 1st November 2014, while the *MNJTF* headquarters would be established by 20th November 2014. Neither of these deadlines was met [6].

not within the framework of the *MNJTF* [16]. Despite this, Nigerian authorities called a halt to their advance. Again, an offer by Chad to join a Nigerian offensive to re-capture the town of *Baga* from *Boko Haram* was rebuffed by Nigeria, despite the claim by Nigeria's spokesman for army operations in the northeast that cooperation between Nigeria and Chad had yielded some major military successes, and the Chadian claim that there had been no joint operations [19].

Similarly, disagreements with Niger and Cameroon have weakened the enforcement of both bilateral and multilateral trans-border agreements with Nigeria. The labeling of Nigerian troops as 'cowards' by the Nigerien contingent, and the counter-labeling of Nigerien troops as 'serial looters' by the Nigerian army created tensions between both contingents that impeded trans-border security cooperation (*Global Security*, 2015). Owing to the inertia in actualizing the intentions of the *Cameroon-Nigeria Transborder Security Committee*, Cameroon forces stationed in their forward base in the town of *Gamboru* on the Nigeria-Cameroon border, were given orders not to enter Nigeria, while Cameroon also denies Nigerian troops the right to pursue insurgents into Cameroon [6]. It is clear that mutual suspicions and conflicting interests among member states of the *LCBC* have affected the operations of the *MNJTF* (*CLEEN Foundation*, 2015). The fact that all Nigeria's allies in the *MNJTF* are former French colonies with strong ties to France may be a major factor in the

cautious but sluggish approach to trans-border security cooperation. Strong contentions that Nigeria's attitude constitutes an impediment to progress in regional cooperation, cite Nigeria's tendency to take action without consultation, the absence of Nigerian troops when it came to occupying towns retaken from Boko Haram and, its general difficulty in consolidating the gains made against *Boko Haram* by the other countries. Despite the outward show of favorable disposition among the contingents of the *MNJTF*, they still reflect certain elements of distrust when it comes to collaborating directly with the Nigerian army [5].

Another factor that contributes to the weak enforcement of trans-border security agreements is the lack of adequate equipment. It is reported that customs and immigration personnel constantly complain of lack of adequate logistics and vehicles to patrol the border communities effectively [6]. In 2013, the Nigerian government disclosed its plans to install \$2.6 million worth of surveillance equipment along its borders [8]. Despite the urgency of the security situation in the northeast, as at 2014 a year later, the *Comptroller-General* of the NIS disclosed that the service lacked the relevant technology to monitor and man the border [3], enabling the smuggling of SALW into the country through the borders by means of petrol tankers, light trucks, motor-cycles, tricycles, camels and donkeys.

A combination of the above factors of the over-deployment of the Nigerian military for internal security operations, the paucity of border security personnel, inadequate funding, unresolved boundary disputes, government inertia, lack of cooperation and mutual distrust among the contingents of the *MNJTF* demonstrate the weak enforcement of trans-border agreements.

It should be noted that the major push factors of SALW proliferation in northeast

Nigeria have been the political instability and collapse in states like Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). The major pull factor for the proliferation of SALW in northeast Nigeria within the period under study has been the *Boko Haram* insurgency which has dramatically increased the demand for such weapons to prosecute its war against the Nigerian state. The weakness of the *intervening obstacle* is represented by the porosity of Nigeria's borders and the weak enforcement of trans-border security agreements discussed above.

Small arms are defined as 'any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive' and that is designed to be carried and used by one person including exploding bombs, incendiary bombs, gas bombs, grenades, rocket launchers, missiles, missile systems or landmines; revolvers and pistols with automatic loading; rifles and carbines; machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns [14].

Light weapons are defined as weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a crew; which may be transported by two or more people, a pack animal or a light vehicle, including heavy machine guns, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted portable anti-aircraft cannons; portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil guns; portable anti-tank missile launchers or rocket launchers; portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; and mortars with a caliber of less than 100 millimeters, cartridges, munitions for small caliber weapons; projectiles and missiles for small arms; mobile containers with missiles or projectiles for anti-aircraft or anti-tank simple action systems [14].

CONCLUSION

The study noted that cohesiveness and expansiveness of transnational networks is mainly responsible for the unending flow of cross-border migration into and out of

northeast Nigeria. Tables showing dominant transnational ethno/religious cultures in northeast Nigeria; apprehension/deportation of illegal

migrants in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno and Yobe States between 2009 and 2015; incidence of illegal migrants in northeast Nigeria within the period under study among others were presented as evidence.

The study observed that the legal and institutional frameworks for border management in Nigeria are manifested in the enactment of laws and the establishment of agencies of government charged with various aspects of border control. Even though the length of Nigeria's borders, as well as the terrain and topography of the border areas present difficulties for monitoring and patrol, the

porosity of Nigeria's borders is equally due to the nature of the border control regime. Tables showing major border management agencies in Nigeria, border communities in Nigeria, list of illegal routes into Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, estimate of SALW in circulation in Nigeria in comparison to other parts of the world and the major routes of impounded illicit arms in West Africa between 2010 and 2014 were presented as findings to support our second hypothesis that poor regional counter insurgency cooperation leads to weapons proliferation in North East Nigeria.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of this work, we put forward the following recommendations for policy implementation:

1. The Federal Government of Nigeria should prioritize border community security through adequate deployment of security officials to border regions. There should be proper funding and capacity building of these security agencies to enable them manage

- insurgencies and other crimes in Nigerian borders,
2. There should be improved intelligence sharing between Nigeria and neighbouring states that it shares borders with. Nigeria has a vast border most of which are unmanned. Better intelligence sharing will improve crime prevention strategy across trans-borders.

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