

Insurgency in The North-East Nigeria: The Implication of Cross Border Pastoral Migration

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the link between insurgency and trans-border pastoral migration and extremist radicalization in North-East Nigeria. Thus the major problem that elicit the desire for this work is if poor management of pastoral trans-border migration is implicated in the insurgency in North-East Nigeria. The migrant control propositions extracted from migration theory will be used as our frame work of analysis. Our data analysis will be sourced from the secondary source of data findings includes that many of pastoral migrants are not keeping to the laws within the ECWAS agreement on cross border pastoral migration and that of Lake Chad Basic Commission (LCBC). Also the incessant conflict between farmers and herders is as a result of scarcity of resources, increase in herds, and human population. Therefore it is recommended that strict compliance to the multi-lateral agreements be carried out. Again, Ranchers should be established in line with global practises to reduce the clashes between farmers and herders.

Keywords: Insurgency, North East, Pastoral Migration

INTRODUCTION

Trans-border migration refers to the movement of people across national boundaries. It involves crossing from one country into another for varying durations of time, for the purpose of taking advantage of economic, political or social opportunity or for the perpetration of crime [1]; [2] & [3]. The past two decades have witnessed a steady rise in trans-border migration worldwide, with the number of international migrants worldwide rising by over 77 million or by 50 per cent. Much of this growth occurred between 2000 and 2010, with Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, recording the highest annual average growth rate in migration with 2.8 percent (*UNDESA, 2013*). Census-based estimates by the United Nations Population Division suggest that West Africa has the largest absolute international immigrant stock in Africa. It is also the only part of sub-Saharan Africa where migration, relative to the total population, has been increasing over the past few decades [4].

The magnitude and dimensions of trans-border movements in sub-Saharan Africa, the growing proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW); the growth of radical anti-state ideologies and movements, and the increasingly aggressive activities of migrant pastoralists has led to growing concerns over the various effects of these phenomena, particularly as it affects the national security of sovereign states in the sub-region (especially Nigeria which is the economic and demographic superpower of the region).

Nigeria occupies a territory covering 923,768 square kilometers and shares land borders of 770 kilometers with Benin to the west, 90 kilometers with Chad to the northeast, 1,500 kilometers with Niger to the north and 1,700 kilometers with Cameroon to the east [5]. Geopolitically, northeast Nigeria spans an area of 275,667 square kilometers and comprises the states of *Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba* and *Yobe* which host an estimated combined population of 19.5 million

people. The region is predominantly peopled by the *Balewa*, *Babur*, *Fulani*, *Mumuye*, *Tangalawaja*, *Tiv* and *Kanuri* ethnic groups, with the *Fulani* and *Kanuri* in particular extending beyond Nigeria's borders into Niger, Chad and Cameroun [5]. Thus, migrant flows occur frequently and easily across the borders with these contiguous countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon, and are perceived by the local populations as being within the same socio-cultural space rather than between different nations [6].

The fact that there are over 1,499 illegal and 84 officially identified entry routes into Nigeria, confirms the very porous nature of the country's borders [4], and makes the task of securing and monitoring migrant flows across them very difficult. The porosity of Nigeria's borders is due to the way the colonialists delineated them as well as to the management and control of these borders by the Nigerian state. The original objective of the colonial powers in the geopolitical division of the African continent was not to create logical boundaries, but to create spheres of influence driven by political and economic motivations. These boundaries, defined in terms of latitudes, longitudes, geometric circles and straight lines, split several ethnic and cultural communities [7]. Consequently, most African governments have found it difficult to administer borders that slice through ethnic and cultural groups, and to rationalize borders that were not created by them. Thus the geopolitical incongruities of the post-colonial African states provide a context for understanding the challenges of border control and illegal migration into Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

Since 2009, the rise in acts of terrorism committed by the militant Islamist group *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), also known as *Boko Haram*, has created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in northeastern Nigeria in particular, and the entire country in general. The insurgence of this group has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and millions of naira worth of property, eclipsing Nigeria's longstanding security threats such as piracy, militancy in the Niger delta,

Nigerian policy makers appear not to have anticipated the large flow of trans-border migration that was likely to occur as well as the national security implications of such a flow once the country signed and ratified the *ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People* in 1979. Within three years, there was a wave of migrants from ECOWAS member states, many of whom did not obtain ECOWAS travel documents or arrive through official designated points of entry. Consequently, thousands of migrants, including a large wave of migrants from Niger and Chad [8], began to pour into Nigeria. None-the-less, the Chadian war accounted for the greatest movement of migrants into Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria, and it was the economic opportunities available to the immigrants in Nigeria that provided the sustenance that kept them even longer than before [9].

However, the securitization of migration remains a political necessity, given that the border is the first line of defense against terrorism and the last line of a nation's territorial integrity [10], and has become an imperative objective in most countries [11]. From 2009, Nigeria began to experience new security challenges in the form of terrorist attacks against government institutions, public infrastructure, and individuals. Given the activities of criminal organizations that traffic in SALW and persons, as well as terrorist groups like *Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM) in the Sahel region and the rise of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria's northeast, national and international concern has increased with respect to the flow of illegal movements across Nigeria's northern borders and the security implications inherent therein.

kidnapping and armed robbery [4]. The group's *modus operandi* often involves brutal attacks within Nigeria, and hasty retreats to safe havens in the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroun. The incidence of trans-border related insecurity in northeastern Nigeria has persisted despite the massive budgetary allocations to the security sector, as well as the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in partnership with Nigeria's immediate neighbors. The existence of other trans-border cooperation arrangements such as bilateral Joint

Commissions aimed at strengthening border security and combating transnational threats have met with little success in controlling illegal migration in northeastern Nigeria.

Given the historical experience of migrant-related violence in northern Nigeria, whereby in the early 1980's, religious disturbances with links to migrant settlers began to manifest in parts of northern Nigeria, particularly in Kano state, the role of immigrants in these disturbances became apparent given that the *Maitatsine* disturbances of the early 1980's was spearheaded by a radical preacher from northern Cameroun [12] Also, the mass exodus of *almajiri* into Kano from Niger was identified to be critical in their involvement in the *Maitatsine* crisis of 1981, where it was observed that about 85 per cent of the 187 aliens that were arrested during the disturbance came from Niger Republic [13], and many others from Chad [14].

The arguments by scholars that illegal migrants and asylum-seekers provide channels for potential terrorists [15]; also that irregular migrants participate in illegal, politically destabilizing activities [16] and that the dynamic increase in irregular migration processes contributes to the rise of new threats to the national security [17] are mostly speculative and fail to establish any concrete evidence linking illegal migration and terrorism.

Furthermore, they fail to show how national security threats arise uniquely from illegal migrants as opposed to legal migrants, given that statistically, illegal migration accounts for no more than 50

percent of all migration worldwide. The argument that undocumented migration is a very serious security problem in Nigeria [18], is weakened by the view of [19] and [20] who argue otherwise, positing that illegal migration need not be considered a security problem if it is properly handled.

Similarly, the seasonal trans-border migratory trends of nomadic pastoralists from Niger and Chad have led to several bloody conflicts with farmers in northeastern Nigeria, resulting in hundreds of deaths and forcing the government to expel hundreds of these pastoralists from Demboa Local government Area of Borno State in 2009 [21] It is also estimated that over 20,000 pastoralists have been expelled from northern Nigeria since 2009 [22]. In 2012 and 2013, bloody clashes between herdsman and farmers left several people dead in Adamawa state, and 43 dead in Taraba. The seasonal cross-border migration of nomadic pastoralists from Niger and Chad has been well noted by scholars who have mainly attributed this trend to various reasons such as the growth of herds, search for grazing lands and climatic changes [1]; [2] [3].

However, within the literature on pastoralist-farmer conflicts, scholars have identified resource conflicts as the most pronounced manifestation of herder-farmer engagement in northeastern Nigeria, and have adduced a number of factors responsible for this. These factors include competition for arable land [4], cultural differences [5]; [6], institutional failure [7]; [8], migratory trends of pastoralists [9] & [10]; [11], proliferation of weapons [12], [13].

Theoretical Framework

The link between migration and trans-network of insurgency and crime will be explained using the migrant control framework derived from Everett Lee's *Theory of Migration*. The migrant control framework is synthesized from a combination of ideas centering on the securitization of migration by states, with regard to the *push and pull* factors of migration, by means of the political *intervening obstacles* of international border controls and immigration restrictions identified in Lee's migration theory.

There is no single general theory of migration, but several approaches seeking to explain why people migrate have been derived from the *push and pull factors* model. The *push and pull* concept of migration was first advanced by Ernst Ravenstein in 1885. Ravenstein who is generally regarded as the earliest migration theorist, used census data from England and Wales in the 19th century to develop his *Laws of Migration* in which he concluded that migration was governed by a "push-pull" process directly related to better economic opportunity whereby unfavorable

conditions in one place “push” people out, and favorable conditions in an external location “pull” people out. He theorized that every migrant flow generates a counter-migration; that improvements in transport lead to greater volumes of migration; that economic motives are the main stimulus for migration; and that while migration is generally beneficial to receiving states, illegal migration is a threat to the country. Ravenstein’s theory has remained relevant and subsequent migration models such as the neoclassical economic theory and the World Systems theory have been based on the push-pull model.

However, [14] reformulated Ravenstein’s “push-pull” theory to include non-economic push factors that included climate, family ties and quality of education. His significant contribution to this theory however, is his inclusion of what he termed *intervening obstacles* such as physical distance, cost of making the journey, cultural barriers, and political obstacles like international borders and immigration restrictions which have to be overcome. He postulated that volume of migration is directly related to difficulty in surmounting intervening obstacles, and that unless severe checks or migrant controls are imposed, both the volume and the rate of migration tend to increase over time.

Push dynamics of migration have been identified by various scholars to include political factors such as conflict, political instability, war and persecution [15]; economic factors such as unemployment, poor wages and rising cost of living [16]; [17]; [18]; and environmental factors such as climate change, natural disasters, famine, drought and dwindling natural resources [19]. In the same way, pull factors of migration correspond to political, economic or environmental dynamics such as higher wages, better employment, political stability, better climatic conditions and availability of resources.

Migrant control framework consists of ideas and concepts seeking to explain the behavior of states with respect to the securitization of migration, and seeks to

explain the link between migration and national security. Its major suppositions are as follows:

- That states are disposed to address the challenge posed by international migration to their national security, specifically to their ability to regulate the movement of people across their borders [20] by means of border security and immigration control policies.
- That the volume of migration is directly related to the difficulty in surmounting intervening obstacles, and that unless severe checks are imposed, both the volume and the rate of migration tend to increase over time [9];
- That migration as a security issue cannot be managed on a unilateral basis by individual destination states, but requires meaningful cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination [4]
- That states formulate immigration policies to encourage some forms of border crossing and not others;
- That illegal migration is a threat to national security, and uncontrolled migrant flows across borders produce additional stresses on already weak state institutions, heighten competition over scarce resources, and exacerbate ethnic and sectarian tensions [7].
- That even though states possess extensive authority to control the entrance of immigrants into their territories, they are generally unsuccessful in controlling illegal immigration .

The migrant control framework assumes that international movements are highly susceptible to political and administrative controls and views national legislation, administrative decisions, immigration reforms and trans-border cooperation as the most recognizable policy responses of migration control. It posits that the general impact of migration on national security therefore depends on the efficacy of a particular state’s policy to shape migration flows according to its overall national interests.

Cross-Border Pastoralism and Extremist Radicalization in Northeast Nigeria

The seasonal nature of cross-border transhumance into Nigeria is determined by various socio-economic, political, climatic and ecological *push* factors arising within these countries of origin, as well as corresponding *pull* factors within Nigeria. This chapter examined cross-border pastoralism and extremist radicalization in northeast Nigeria. Specifically, it examined

Transnational Pastoralism and Resource Competition in Northeast Nigeria

Nomadic pastoralism in the area that constitutes present-day northern Nigeria is an occupation that predates the colonial era in West Africa, and has been a source of livelihood for millions of pastoral peoples including the *Fulani*, *Baggara*, *Shuwa*, *Kanuri*, *Woodabe*, *Mober*, *Teda*, *Tuareg* and several others [21]. However, owing to the manner of colonial geopolitical delineations, the ethno-cultural spread of many of these pastoral peoples extends beyond the borders of Nigeria and into the neighboring countries of the *Lake Chad Basin*, with significant numbers of pastoralists in Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Northeast Nigeria is bordered by Niger and Chad to the north and Cameroon to the east. Much of this area lies within the semi-arid ecological zone, with the extreme fringes of northeast Nigeria falling into to the arid desert zone. These ecological zones support brush-grass savanna and steppe grassland vegetation that are able to sustain livestock only during the rainy seasons. According to [22] northeast Nigeria hosts one of the largest populations of nomadic herds in northern Nigeria and serves as an important transhumant route for cattle herds from Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Seasonal movements of men and livestock in search of pasture throughout the *Sahel* and West Africa is an ancient practice dictated by the realities of climate and vegetation, and necessitated by the need for the survival of pastoral livestock. Such movements typically comprise large scale migration of livestock, especially cattle, over hundreds of kilometers and often require the herds to move across the national borders of their countries of origin, and into neighboring countries in search of pasture and water (FAO/ECOWAS,

the relationship trans-national pastoralism and resource competition in northeast Nigeria, Nigeria's government and regional efforts at managing scarcity induced resource competition and the effect of the poor management of cross-border pastoralism on extremist radicalization in northeast Nigeria.

2012). Trans-national pastoralism in the *Sahel* and West Africa involves about 70-90 per cent of the cattle in the region, occurring mainly in the arid areas of the Sahel countries, northern Nigeria and Cameroon. Thus, transhumant migrations into Nigeria from Niger, Chad and Cameroon are frequent seasonal occurrences. Various pastoralist organizations estimate that over two million cattle are involved annually in transhumance to countries that include Nigeria and Chad (FAO/ECOWAS, 2012).


According to [9] the seasonal nature of cross-border transhumance into Nigeria is determined by various socio-economic, political, climatic and ecological *push* factors arising within these countries of origin, as well as corresponding *pull* factors within Nigeria. Push factors have been identified to include resource scarcity [6],[4] [12], climate change and water scarcity [6],[8]. Major pull factors have been identified as the availability of water and grazing land [5],[2]; [4], and access to markets [3]; [5]. However, the security dimension of cross-border transhumance into Nigeria is exacerbated by the weakness of the *intervening obstacles* of transhumance control protocols.

In Niger, 29 per cent of the population engages in pastoralism and livestock production which accounts for 14 per cent of the *Gross Domestic Product* (US Department of State, 2009). The country's livestock herds include an estimated 8.7 million head of cattle [5]. According to the *International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs*, the pastoral peoples of Niger include the *Peul*, *Tuareg* and *Toubou*, with the *Peu* who are the main cattle herders being sub-divided into the *Tolèbé*, *Gorgabé*, *Djelgobé* and *Bororo* [6]. It is significant to

note that the *Peul* are the indigenous *Fulani* of Niger [6], and that the Fulani in neighboring Nigeria are the most dominant pastoral group, numbering around 12 million, and accounting for about 25 per cent of the pastoral peoples of sub-Saharan Africa [16]. Apart from the southernmost portion of the country which lies in the


semi-arid zone, most of Niger lies in the arid ecological zone which supports desert, semi-desert and steppe brush vegetation, necessitating cross-border transhumance migrations into Nigeria during the dry seasons. These movements, however, are legitimized by the 1998 *ECOWAS* Protocol on Trans-national pastoralism.

Figure 1: Vegetation zones in the Sahel and West Africa



Source: Culled from Egonu (2017)

Figure 2: Agro-ecological zones of West Africa



Source: Culled from Egonu (2017)

Figures 1 and 2 are maps that show the vegetation and agro-ecological zones that


help to clarify the relationship between the climatic distribution of humidity, major

vegetation types in the areas where pastoralism dominates, and the predominant reason for trans-national pastoralism. According to [5], the distribution of humidity and vegetation during dry season necessitates the southward movement of herds across the borders, and toward the semi-arid, sub-humid and humid zones in Nigeria where they have access to water, deciduous forest woodland and brush-grass savanna which are ideal for grazing.

A country like Chad is a major livestock producing country with about 7 million cattle and 40 per cent of the population engaged in livestock production. This accounts for 18 per cent of the *Gross Domestic Product* [6]; [5]. It is estimated that about 80 per cent Chad's livestock are herded by nomadic pastoralists, of which the *Toubous* and the *Fulani* are the dominant pastoral groups [19]. Much of Chad's vegetation falls within the arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid ecological zones which support desert, semi-desert and brush grass savanna vegetation. During the dry seasons these vegetation zones are not conducive to livestock grazing, thereby necessitating southward cross-border movements into Nigeria in search of pasture. However, because Chad is not a

member of *ECOWAS*, these transhumance movements from Chad are not regulated by the *ECOWAS* transhumance protocol, but are permitted under international agreements between the *Lake Chad Basin Commission* (LCBC) member countries which enable free transhumance movement within the Chad Basin, subject to animal vaccinations and payment of local and national taxes [15]. Also, [8] noted that Cameroon has about 5.9 million cattle, with about 80 per cent of the population engaged in agriculture and livestock, which accounts for 13 per cent of the *Gross Domestic Product*. It is estimated that about 75.4 per cent of the national herd is found in North Province most of which lies in the semi-arid ecological zone supporting brush grass savanna vegetation [5]. Seasonal variations in rainfall and vegetation engender cross-border transhumant migrations into Nigeria, particularly the Adamawa highlands which lie in the humid ecological zone and supports deciduous forest and woodland savanna vegetation. Similar to the situation in Chad, these cross-border transhumant movements are permitted under agreements between the *Lake Chad Basin Commission* member countries which enable free transhumance movement within the Chad Basin

.Figure 3:Cross-border Transhumance Routes into Northeast Nigeria



Source: Moutari, E.M & Giraut, F. (2013). *Is the international transhumance corridor in Sahel an archetype of multi-sited territory?* *L'Espece Géographique*, 42 (4), 293.

It can be observed that the predominant semi-arid agro-ecological zone of northeastern Nigeria is comparatively more advantageous for dry season pastoralism than the predominant agro-ecology of Niger, Chad and the northernmost parts of Cameroon, and therefore offers a natural attraction for cross-border transhumance from these countries. The dry season begins between October and December, reducing relative humidity, grass and water supplies thereby triggering southward movement of herds towards more humid zones. These movements follow routes along the rivers and stream valleys [8], and frequently involve crossing into northern Nigeria. Over time, these movements have generated a network of cross-border routes or *corridors* consisting of herd infrastructure such as vaccination areas, watering spots, supply markets, transit and rest areas and grazing reserves [5]

In fact, figure 6.3 above shows trans-national pastoral corridors running from northern Cameroon and southeastern Niger into the sub-humid zones of northeast Nigeria. Trails that run from Chad into Niger appear to terminate at the border with Nigeria. However, considering that this termination point falls within the arid zone, it is reasonable to assume that as the dry season intensifies between January and February, extreme dryness, water scarcity and reduction in the quality and quantity of pasture occasioned by further drops in relative humidity will cause further southward movement into northeast Nigeria. The cross-border trails into Nigeria show movement towards savanna grasslands where agriculture is dominant. The two-way arrows show the cross-border movement in both directions, corresponding to seasonal changes that determine the availability of pasture and water. In northeast Nigeria, these corridors consist of an intricate and well established system of tracks and trails that traverse watering spots and grazing reserves [14].

According to [18], several cross-border routes into northeast Nigeria can be seen along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, as well

as along the Nigeria-Niger border, west of *Lake Chad*. Major trans-national pastoral routes that originate within northeast Nigeria can also be observed running towards these same border crossing areas, invariably increasing the cattle populations of the humid and sub-humid environments, particularly around *Adamawa* and *Taraba* during the dry seasons. It is significant that these routes frequently overlap and transverse farmlands and crop fields that provide livelihoods for sedentary farmers and other land users.

Though cross-border transhumant routes are adaptable based on varying conditions encountered in moving herds in search of pasture, they are neither random nor haphazardly selected. They correspond to itineraries that offer the highest gains in terms of quality of pasture, availability of drinking water, security of the herds, markets for livestock sale and specific tracks designated as *corridors* for pastoralists to facilitate their passage through farmlands (FAO/ECOWAS, 2012). Apart from pasture, water, resting places and passage, transhumance corridors are also designed to provide linkages to livestock markets [14];[19] ; [5]. It has been observed that long range transhumance in the *Sahel* and West Africa involves numerous large scale cattle movements from north to south in the dry season, and less numerous return movements from south to north during the rainy season (Alidou, 2016; FAO/ECOWAS, 2012). It is also significant that these voluminous north-south movements correspond with the cross-border livestock trade routes along regional corridors that terminate in the market centers south of the *Sahel*. In the *Sahel* and West Africa, many of these routes run from Chad, Niger, Central African Republic, Mali and Burkina Faso to Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin and Togo [3]. Figure 6.5 below shows that of the three cross-border transhumance trade routes that run through northeast Nigeria, one terminates at the Borno-Yobe axis, one runs through Borno, Yobe and Bauchi, and the other runs through the Adamawa-Taraba axis




Figure 4: Cross-border Livestock Trade Routes in Sahel and West Africa

Source: Guibert, B; Banzhaf, M; Soulé, B.G; Balami, D.H; &Idé, G. (2009). Regional study on the

contexts of livestock commercialization, access to markets and the challenges of improving the living conditions of pastoral communities. *Institut de Recherches et d'Applications des Methodes de Développement (IRAM)*. www.iram-fr.org

Figure 4 above shows that Nigeria accounts for 7 out of the 16 major cross-border livestock traderoutes in the *Sahel* and West Africa. According to [6], these routes predate the colonial era, and were known to service cattle movements into Nigeria from Niger, Chad and Cameroon. [4]also claimed

that long distance livestock trade flows existed in pre-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. According to UN FAO, the Nigerian market is the main driver of the livestock trade in this region, with Nigerian demand having jumped significantly over the last 20 years (FAO/ECOWAS, 2012). It can also be observed that transhumant trade routes for cattle coming from as far as Chad are found in northeast Nigeria [7]It is known that one of the largest cattle markets in West Africa is found in *Potiskum, Yobe State* [15] and [20].

Nigerian Government and Regional Efforts at Managing Scarcity-Induced Resource Competition

Trans-national pastoralism between Nigeria and neighbouring states occur within certain regional and bilateral regulatory frameworks. The *ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol* of 1998, to which Nigeria is party, allows for cross-border pastoral mobility among the 15 member states. The protocol, pursuant to *Decision A/DEC.5/10/98* on the regulation of transhumance between the *ECOWAS* Member States, and *Regulation C/REG.3/01/03* relating to the

implementation of the regulations on transhumance between the *ECOWAS* Member States, authorizes cross-border transhumance subject to the setting by each country of its entry and exit points and demarcation of defined grazing corridors, as well as the issuance of an *International Transhumance Certificate (ITC)* stipulating the number of livestock, immunization status and migratory itinerary (*ECOWAS*, 2003). This legal

framework, while granting legitimacy to cross-border transhumance flows originating in West Africa, does not cover transhumance flows into northeast Nigeria from Chad and Cameroon which are not members of ECOWAS.

According to [5] the frameworks for transhumance management in Nigeria are

accommodate the seasonal movement of herds include the *Grazing Reserve Act* of 1964 and the *National Agricultural Policy* of 1988. The 1964 grazing reserve law granted state and local governments the power to establish grazing reserves with the aim of discouraging nomadism, encouraging sedentary pastoralism and improving productivity through the reduction of conflict [6]. The 1988 *National Agricultural Policy* required that 10 per cent of national territory be allocated as grazing reserves for lease to herders [5]. However, weak enforcement of these legal frameworks is evidenced by the fact that as at 1998, ten years after the policy enactment, only 52 out of 313 acquired grazing reserves had been gazetted [17]. Also, as at 2014, only 141 of the 415 grazing routes in the country had been gazetted, with less than 20 of them being equipped with resources and infrastructure for pastoralists [19]. Another significant weakness of transhumance management in Nigeria is the fact that the gazetted reserves do not sufficiently cater for dry season grazing. This forces herders to leave the reserves in search of pasture, bringing them into closer proximity with farmers and heightening the prospect of resource conflicts [3].

According to a *Ministry of Agriculture and Forest Resources* Report, northeastern Nigeria hosts a major 3000 kilometer pastoral corridor running from Chad and Cameroon, through *Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe* and *Taraba* States, and terminating in the *Benue-Niger* Basins [6]. Transhumance flows into northeast Nigeria from these countries are regulated within the framework of the *Lake Chad Basin Commission* (LCBC). Subject to *Decision Number 2* of the 10th Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, international transhumance movement within the Chad Basin is subject to preparation of a cattle

manifested in the various national laws, bilateral agreements and regional protocols aimed at regulating pastoralism within Nigeria, as well as between Nigeria and her neighbors. Within Nigeria, transhumance control frameworks that exist in the form of national laws designed to

passport and transhumance certificate, animal vaccinations and payment of local and national taxes [11]; [4]. The Protocol Agreement recognizes the demarcation of a 1500 kilometer transhumance corridor with 44 watering holes [15].

In addition, cross-border pastoralism from Niger into northeast Nigeria is also regulated within the framework of the *Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission*. Within a control framework for the management of livestock mobility, the commission handles issues of animal health and transhumance through mapping livestock corridors, establishment of cattle control posts and implementation of animal health programs [16]. Nigeria is also a signatory to the *African Union's* 2011 pastoral policy framework which requires national laws to facilitate cross-border pastoralism [2].

The weakness of the intervening obstacles of immigration policy and border control mechanisms is evidenced by the failure of the Nigerian state to effectively enforce the requirements of its bilateral and regional agreements on cross-border transhumance. In practice, the requirements of the 1998 *ECOWAS Protocol* as well as other similar agreements are not enforced, particularly with regards to the *International Transhumance Certificate (Sahel Standards, 2016; FAO/ECOWAS, 2012)*. According to the *World Organization for Animal Health*, it was found that at the strategic veterinary control post of *Gamboru-Ngala*, along the Nigeria-Cameroon border in Borno State, the documents accompanying livestock from Cameroon, Chad and Central African Republic were not in accordance with recommended international transhumance certificates. It is also of significance that at this post, the number of transhumant livestock is not accurately determined, owing to inadequacies in personnel strength and handling capacity (*WOAH, 2007*).

Resource conflicts in northeast Nigeria arise from competition over scarce resources, and herder-farmer conflict have been identified as the most pronounced manifestation of such resource conflicts in northeastern Nigeria [13]; [11]; [9]. Resources such as arable land and fresh water serve as powerful *pull* factors for herds crossing the borders from arid zones outside Nigeria. These herds are forced to compete not only with sedentary land users, but with other herds originating within Nigeria.

phenomenon that triggers conflicts over access to land. Estimates from the *Federal Ministry of Environment* suggests that with the *Sahel* advancing southward at a rate of 1,400 square miles a year, and a 400 per cent increase in sand dunes over twenty years, up to two-thirds of *Bauchi*, *Borno*, *Gombe* and *Yobe* states in northeast Nigeria are in danger of becoming desert or semi-desert within the twenty-first century [8].

The desertification of significant portions of southern Niger, Chad, northern Cameroon and northeast Nigeria forces a deeper southward movement of cross-border herds towards the more humid climes, placing greater pressures on land and water resources within the brush-grass savanna of northeast Nigeria, and escalating the incidence of conflict [21]. Also, table 6.2 below shows the fifteen northern states most affected by desertification, which includes all the states in northeast Nigeria. It is significant that of all the states experiencing severe desertification, *Borno* and *Yobe* in the northeast occupy the largest land masses and the lowest population densities. It can also be seen that of the north-eastern states, *Borno* and *Yobe* which are the northernmost, bordering the arid ecological zone, are subject to severe rates of desertification, while *Bauchi*, *Gombe*, *Adamawa* and *Taraba* which lie within the semi-arid and sub-humid zones are experiencing moderate rates. Given the desert encroachment rate of 350,000 hectares or 0.6 kilometers in northern Nigeria annually [8], the natural consequence is an increase in southward pastoral migration toward the areas of moderate desertification, and the inevitable increase in resource competition and conflict.

Much of northeast Nigeria lies within the brush-grass savanna vegetation belt, with the *Adamawa* and *Taraba* region lying within the deciduous woodland savanna. However, over the past few decades, changes in climatic conditions have led to increasingly hot dry seasons and reductions in rainfall with the consequent reduction in relative humidity, water availability and vegetation in the arid and semi-arid ecological zone of West Africa [11]. These factors, combined with the over-grazing of arable lands, have led to desertification, a

During the course of transhumance migration, pastoralists are forced to compete with other users of the limited land and water resources, such as farmers and fishermen. However, as has been earlier noted, farmer-herder conflicts represent the most prominent materialization of resource conflicts in northeast Nigeria [13]. A combination of political, economic and cultural factors contributes to the incidence of farmer-herder conflict and its escalation within the period under study.

The *ECOWAS Regulation C/REG.3/01/03* acknowledges the social, legal, economic and political problems that can be triggered by cross-border transhumance (*ECOWAS*, 2003). Grazing routes and reserves represent political attempt to obviate some of these problems which include herder-farmer conflicts. However, institutional failures in transhumance management contribute significantly to resource conflicts[5]; [7], as is the case in northeast Nigeria. Both farmers and herder recognize the importance of grazing routes and reserves as a means of conflict prevention, yet because of poor demarcation, farmers crop fields often encroach into grazing corridors and herders find it difficult, if not impossible, to avoid crossing into crop fields [5]; [6]. These institutional failures are evident in the poor monitoring of grazing routes and reserves which, having been originally marked by clear signs such as paint marks on trees, signposts and beacons, are often not protected, allowing farmers to encroach and convert them to farmlands [6]. It has been noted by [20] that the mapping of transhumance infrastructure is weak in the sense that despite the

historical experience of seasonal movements of pastoralists, grazing reserves do not appear on maps. Rather, their movements are shown with arrows (see Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5). It has also been noted that the failure of grazing reserves management in Nigeria, whereby over 400 grazing reserves have failed with respect to the objectives for which they were established, is a cause for anxiety and poses serious prospects for the increase in resource conflict between herders and farmers [6].

It is estimated that about 70 to 90 per cent of the population of northeast Nigeria are engaged in farming a wide variety of crops including millet, sorghum, rice, wheat, cowpeas, groundnuts, maize and potatoes [9]. Resource conflicts between farmers and transhumant herders in northeast Nigeria have been exacerbated by the growth and expansion of rural farming due to institutionally backed projects such as the *World Bank's Fadama* projects in *Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe* and *Taraba* states. Even though the stated objectives of the project include the sustainability of incomes for "all land and water resource users" within the project areas, as well as "providing a source of water for livestock during dry seasons" [10], the term *Fadama* being a *Hausa* word for irrigable land, gives a clear indication as to the underlying priority of farming as the key objective of the project. The *Fadama III* project covering the period between July 2008 and December 2019, falls within the purview of our study and has pursued tremendous incursion into rural areas to enhance farmer operations and productivity through the provision of farming infrastructure, equipment and access to markets [10]. The focus on farmers to the exclusion of livestock and fishery farmers, has exacerbated tensions and intensified pre-existing herder-farmer conflicts [18] It has also been noted that previous *Fadama* projects had helped to extend the farming season by several months each year, thereby denying pastoralists access to their traditional grazing lands [7]. Of the crops grown in the northeast, sorghum, millet, rice, wheat and maize are of vital importance due to their use in local and international food, beverage and animal feed production [5]. It has been noted however, that over 80 per cent of farmers

in Nigeria are smallholder or small-scale subsistence farmers with farms of less than 10 hectares [14]; [11].

The expansion of farming spaces, while symptomatic of the overall importance of agriculture to the economy of the country has resulted in encroachment into pastoral routes and grazing spaces, further engendering farmer-herder competition for resources, and consequently conflict. Desertification in the arid zone and expansion of farming in the sub-humid zone have created greater competition for land and water resources, resulting in conflicts over damaged crops and access to watering points. While the dry season forces a southward movement for pastoralists in search of water, it also forces farmers to appropriate water sources for irrigation of their farms, often denying herders access to these water sources by use of animal traps around streams and ponds (FAO/ECOWAS, 2012). According to [5] the risk of such conflict is increased by 6 per cent in cases of freshwater scarcity.

The movement of cross-border transhumance herds into northeast Nigeria has been established. Though there is a paucity of statistics to quantify the number of animals involved in these movements, various estimates indicate that over two million cattle are involved annually (FAO/ECOWAS, 2012). Studies have shown that within Niger, 44 per cent of the cattle population is involved in cross-border transhumance, with Nigeria as the top destination accounting for 79 per cent of these movements [6]. This implies that 44 per cent or 3.8 million of Niger's 8.7 million cattle are nomadic herds, with about 3 million crossing annually into Nigeria. These herd movements from Niger are also subject to a 0.46 per cent yearly growth rate [7], translating to an additional 13,800 head of cattle yearly. Nigeria's cattle stock is estimated at 19.5 million head with an estimated annual growth rate of 1.5 per cent. According to [3], between 85 and 90 percent of Nigeria's cattle stock are subject to transhumant movements. This implies that over 17 million cattle are involved in transhumant movements within Nigeria during the dry season. Figures for the volume of transhumance from Chad and Cameroon into northeast Nigeria are

not available. However, the figures from Niger serve to demonstrate the magnitude cross-border cattle movements into Nigeria during the dry season. In addition to desertification and the expansion of farmlands, the combination of domestic transhumance involving over 17 million

cattle within Nigeria and the significant sizes of seasonal cross-border herds from Niger, Chad and Cameroon into Nigeria increases the pressure on available resources, thereby generating conflict with resources users, most especially farmers [2].

Effect of Poor Management of Cross-Border Pastoralism on Extremist Radicalization in Northeast Nigeria

The incidence of resource conflicts in northeast Nigeria has witnessed escalations within the period under study showing that the problem has been poorly managed by the government. This has led to the proliferation of extremist radicalization in the northern region of the

country. As has been noted earlier, farmer-herder conflicts represent the most visible manifestation of resource conflicts, and *Table 6.5* below culled from [6] shows a compiled chronology of farmer-herder conflicts in northeast Nigeria.

Table 1: Herder-Farmer Conflicts in Northeast Nigeria 2009-2015

S/N	Reported Date of Conflict	No. of People Killed	Place of Attack	State	Source
1.	2009	1	Borno	Borno	www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/cattle-razing-rural-violence-nigeria.pdf
2.	August, 2010	10	Mubi,	Adamawa	<i>Thisday</i> , August 18, 2010, p. 8
3.	27-1-2011	16	Tafawa-Balewa town, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
4.	27-1-2011	1	Arewa village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
5.	27-1-2011	1	Pekman, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
6.	10-3-2011	2	T/ Balewa town, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
7.	10-3-2011	2	Gumel village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
8.	10-3-2011	N/S	Mingil village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
9.	10-3-2011	4	Gongo village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
10.	10-3-2011	N/S	Malanchi village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
11.	10-3-2011	N/S	Zwall village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1

12.	11-3-2011	N/S	Tafare-Fada village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
13.	11-3-2011	N/S	TafareSabon-Gida village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
14.	11-3-2011	N/S	Goshe village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
15.	16-3-2011	4	Lim-Bisa, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
16.	2-4-2011	1	Gwaska-Bom village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
17.	2-4-2011	N/S	Namu Village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
18.	2-4-2011	3	Gurbuli village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
19.	4-4-2011	1	Yola village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
20.	7-4-2011	5	Barewa village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
21.	12-4-2011	1	Gunlung village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
22.	21-4-2011	7	Kutaru village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
23.	4-5-2011	16	Kurumin-dodo village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
24.	7-5-2011	N/S	Mbat 11 village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
25.	8-5-2011	N/S	Gid-Gidhamma, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
26.	19-11-2011	4	Gargare village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
27.	17-11-2011	2	Muntokshi, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
28.	11-1-2012	N/S	Pyakman, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
29.	19-1-2012	N/S	Jigawa village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
30.	22-1-2012	15	T/Balewa town, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
31.	12-3-2012	N/S	Goshe village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
32.	15-3-2012	N/S	T/Balewa town, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
33.	15-3-2012	N/S	Peknang village,	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1

			T/Balewa LGA		
34.	10-5-2012	2	Kutaru village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
35.	14-5-2012	1	T/Balewa town, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
36.	June 2012	6	Ngandum	Adamawa	Audu, S.D. (2014). Freshwater scarcity as threat to peaceful co-existence between farmers and pastoralists in northern Nigeria. <i>International Journal of Development and Sustainability</i> , 3(1), p.247-248
37.	7-6-2012	N/S	Gwaska-Bom village, Bogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
38.	11-7-2012	4	Dungah-saboBogoro LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
39.	2-8-2012	1	Gongo village, T/Balewa LGA	Bauchi	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
40.	6-4-2013	13	Suwa, Burukutu in L/ Lamurde LGA	Adamawa	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
41.	2013	8	Galtum, Ganye LGA	Adamawa	www.naij.com -8-die-when-farmers-herders-clash-in-adamawa
42.	16-12-2013	-	Tep, Gashaka LGA	Taraba	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
43.	6-2-2014	6	Masu Village, Toungo LGA	Adamawa	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
44.	8-3-2014	10	Gishiri Hassan and Kiorkende Villages, Ibi LGA	Taraba	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
45.	16-3-2014	35	Ikyo, Agwaza, Azer, Lijam, Tse-Saka villages in Takum LGA	Taraba	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
46.	23-3-2014	7	Ibuwa, Ibi LGA	Taraba	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
47.	26-3-2014	9	Vingir village, Takum LGA	Taraba	Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN). Working Paper No. 1
48.	April 2014	77	Wukari	Taraba	www.ifrc.org , www.tvcnews.tv >nigeria-herdsmen-attack-wukari-taraba
49.	January 23 2015	1		Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
50.	January 29 2015	30	Nwonko, wukari	Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
51.	March 2015			Taraba	www.guardian.ng/armed-fulani-herdsmen-seize-taraba-communities/
52.	April 20, 2015	7	Donga LGA	Taraba	www.nigerianeye.com-herdsmen-attack-wukari-taraba-state/

53.	July 8, 2015	2	Gassol LGA	Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
54.	July 11, 2015	4	Dananacha, Gassol LGA,	Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
55.	July 14, 2015	2	Degari, Gassol LGA	Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
56.	September 6, 2015	2	Kortse, Gassol LGA,	Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
57.	September 10, 2015	1	AsemaPever, Gassol LGA	Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
58.	September 12, 2015	10	Sarkin Kudu, Ibi LGA	Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
59.	September 13, 2015	6	Donga LGA	Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
60.	September 15, 2015	9	Ibi, Ibi LGA	Taraba	SBM Intelligence. www.sbmintel.com/Terror-in-Nigerias-foodbasket.pdf
61.	December 2015	1	Laushi-Daji, Biliri LGA	Gombe	www.today.ng/1-killed-4-injured-in-fresh-herders-attack-in-gombe
		356			

Source: Egonu (2017). N/S means *Not Specified*.

Table 1 shows that within the period under study, there were approximately 61 incidents of herder-farmer conflict in northeast Nigeria with an estimated death toll of about 356 people, and a yearly average of 59.3 deaths. *Bauchi* State recorded the highest number of conflicts, with 37 incidents, followed by *Taraba* State with 17 incidents. *Adamawa* recorded 5

incidents, while *Gombe* and *Taraba* recorded 1 incident each. Though this list is possibly not exhaustive, it is indicative of the magnitude and frequency of farmer-herder conflict in northeast Nigeria. When viewed alongside available data for 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2008, the trend in escalation can be better appreciated.

Table 2 Herder-Farmer Conflicts in Northeast Nigeria 2003-2008

S/N	Reported date of attack	No. of persons killed	State	Source
1	2003	63	Adamawa & Gombe	Audu, S.D. (2014). Freshwater scarcity as threat to peaceful co-existence between farmers and pastoralists in northern Nigeria. <i>International Journal of Development and Sustainability</i> , 3(1), p.247-248
2	2003	100	Adamawa	Audu, S.D. (2014). Freshwater scarcity as threat to peaceful co-existence between farmers and pastoralists in northern Nigeria. <i>International Journal of Development and Sustainability</i> , 3(1),p.247-248
3	2005	28	Adamawa	Ofuoku, U.A & Isife, B.I. (2010). Causes, effects and resolution of farmers-nomadic cattle herders conflict in Delta State, Nigeria. <i>Agricultura Tropica et Subtropica</i> , 43 (1), 33.
4	2007	7	Borno	www.nigeriawatch.org -Seven-die-in-born-pastoralist-farmer's-clash/media/doc_acc/G2007-12-25.pdf.

5	2008	7	Taraba	www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/cattle-razing-rural-violence-nigeria.pdf
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Source: Researcher's Compilation.

Table 6 above shows the available data on the incidence of herder-farmer conflicts in northeast Nigeria between 2003 and 2008. It can be seen that within this period leading up to the period of our study, about 205 deaths occurred from 5 conflicts

in *Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Taraba* States, an average rate of 34 deaths a year. A graphical representation of the escalation in the incidence of such resource conflicts from 2009 shall clarify issues further.

Table 3: Chronology of Some Selected Boko Haram Attacks from in Northern Nigeria between 2009 and 2015

DATES	INCIDENT(S)
July 26-29 2009	Nearly 1,000 soldiers were killed in clashes between Boko Haram militants and Nigerian soldiers throughout northern Nigeria, beginning the Boko Haram Islamist Insurgency in Nigeria.
July 30, 2009	Mohammed Yusuf, spiritual leader of Boko Haram, is summarily executed by men of the Nigerian Police after he had been handed over to them by Nigerian soldiers a day before following the recent uprising. Abubakar Shekau takes control of the movement
September 7, 2010	Bauchi prison break, 5 people were killed and 721 inmates are freed from prison in Bauchi by suspected Boko Haram gunmen
December 31, 2010	A bomb attack outside a barracks in Abuja kills four civilians.
May 29, 2011	15 people were killed in Abuja and Bauchi after bombs explode in several towns in northern Nigeria during Goodluck Jonathan's swearing in as the new president.
June 16, 2011	At least two people, the perpetrator and a traffic policeman, were killed in a failed bombing of Abuja's police headquarters. It is Nigeria's first instance of a suicide bombing.
August 26, 2011	21 people were killed in a bombing attack on a United Nations compound in Abuja.
November 4, 2011	Between 100 and 150 people were killed in a series of coordinated assaults in northern Nigeria.
December 22-23, 2011	68 people, of whom are 50 militants, at least 7 soldiers, and 11 civilians, were killed in clashes between Boko Haram militants and Nigerian soldiers in Maiduguri and Damaturu.
December 25, 2011	41 people were killed by Boko Haram bomb attacks and shootings on Christian churches.
January 5-6, 2012	Around 37 Christians are targeted and killed by Boko Haram militants.
January 20, 2012	183 people, of whom at least 150 are civilians and 32 were police officers, are killed in Kano State by Boko Haram gunmen.
April 8, 2012	38 people were killed following a bombing at a church in Kaduna.
June 17, 2012	19 people were killed following bomb attacks against three churches in Kaduna.
August 7, 2012	19 people were killed when Boko Haram gunmen raided a church in Kogi State
August 8, 2012	Two Nigerian soldiers and one civilian are killed in a mosque in an

	apparent reprisal attack for yesterday's massacre
December 25, 2012	27 Christians are killed in Maiduguri and Potiskum by suspected Boko Haram militants.
December 28, 2012	Another 15 Christians were killed in the village of Musari by unknown gunmen
March 18, 2013	Between 22 and 65 people were killed in Kano by a car bombing
April 16, 2013	187 people were killed in Baga in Borno State. It is unclear whether the Nigerian military or Boko Haram is responsible for the massacre
June 9, 2013	Children were killed in Maiduguri and 13 students and teachers are killed in Damaturu by Boko Haram
July 6, 2013	More than 42 are killed by Boko Haram gunmen in a Yobe State school
August 12-56, 2013	People are killed by Boko Haram in a Maiduguri mosque
September 12, 2013	Ambush by Boko Haram leaves 40 soldiers dead
September 12-18, 2013	An offensive by Nigerian Army leaves 150 Islamists and 16 soldiers dead
September 19, 2013	Benisheik Attacks- 161 are killed in attacks blamed on Boko Haram
September 29, 2013	Gujba College Massacre- More than 50 students are killed in Yobe State by Boko Haram gunmen
October 10, 2013	An attack at Damboa leaves at least 20 killed (15 suspected militants and 5 civilians)
October 29, 2013	Boko Haram raids Damaturu. At least 128 people are killed (95 militants, 23 soldiers, 8 policemen, and 2 civilians)
January 14, 2014	35 people were killed in a bombing by Boko Haram militants in Maiduguri, Borno State
January 31, 2014	11 Christians killed in Chakawa by Boko Haram militants
February 14, 2014	121 Christian villagers killed by Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno State
February 15, 2014	106 killed the village of Izghe, Borno State by Boko Haram gunmen.
February 15, 2014	90 Christians and 9 Nigerian soldiers are killed in Gwosa by Boko Haram
February 24, 2014	Dozens killed as Boko Haram again raids Izghe
February 25, 2014	Federal Government College Attack- 59 male students killed in a school massacre in Yobe State.
March 14, 2014	Boko Haram attacks the heavily fortified Giwa military barracks in Maiduguri, freeing comrades from a detention facility. The military then executes about 600 unarmed recaptured detainees, according to Amnesty International
April 14, 2014	Over 88 people killed in a twin bombing attack in Abuja.
April 15, 2014	Chibok Schoolgirls Kidnapping- 276 female students in Borno State are kidnapped by Boko Haram
MAY, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May 1 - 19 killed in Abuja by a car bomb. • May 5 - At least 300 people are killed in the twin towns of Gamboru and Ngala in Borno State by Boko Haram militants. • May 20 - At least 118 villagers are killed by car bombs in the city of Jos. • May 21 - 27 villagers are killed by Boko Haram gunmen in northeastern Nigeria • May 27 - 49 security personnel and 9 civilians are killed during a Boko Haram attack on a military base in Yobe State. • May 30 - The third emir of Gwoza, Idrissa Timta, is assassinated during a Boko Haram ambush.

JUNE, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • June 1 - 2014 Mubi bombing, at least 40 people are killed by a bomb in Mubi, Adamawa State. • June 2 - Gwoza massacre, at least 200, mostly Christians, are killed in several villages in Borno State by Boko Haram. • June 20-23 - June 2014 Borno State attacks, at 70 people are killed and 91 women and children kidnapped by Boko Haram militants in Borno State. • June 23-25 - June 2014 central Nigeria attacks, around 171 people are killed in a series of attacks in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. • June 26 - Over 100 militants are killed by the Nigerian military during a raid on two Boko Haram camps. • June 28 - 11 people are killed by a bomb in Bauchi
July 18, 2014	At least 18 were killed by a Boko Haram attack in Damboa, leaving the town almost destroyed
July 22, 2014	51 people were killed by Boko Haram in Chibok
September 19, 2014	Around 30 people were killed by Boko Haram militants at a busy market in Mainok, Borno State
October 31, 2014	At least 4 people were killed, 32 injured and 13 vehicles destroyed by an explosion at a bus station in Gombe
NOVEMBER, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kogi Prison Break- 99 inmates in Kogi State are freed by suspected Boko Haram rebels. • November 3-10 - 2014 Yobe State attacks, a double suicide bombing in Yobe State kills 15 Shiites on the 3rd and 46 students on the 10th. • November 25 - Over 45 people are killed by two suicide bombers in Maiduguri, Borno State. • November 27 - Around 50 people are killed in Damasak by Boko Haram militants. • November 28 - 2014 Kano bombing, at least 120 Muslim followers of the Emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi II, are killed during a suicide bombing and gun attack by Boko Haram. The 4 gunmen are subsequently killed by an angry mob.
DECEMBER, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • December 1 - at least 5 people are killed by two female suicide bombers who detonated explosions at a crowded market place in Maiduguri, Borno State. • December 6 - Minna prison break, 270 prisoners are freed from a prison in Minna. Boko Haram is not suspected to be involved in the attack. • December 10 - At least 4 people are killed and 7 injured by female suicide bombers near a market in Kano • December 11-30 people are killed and houses are destroyed by Boko Haram militants in Gajiganna, Borno State. • December 13 - 2014 Gumsuri kidnappings, between 32 and 35 are killed and between 172 and 185 are kidnapped by Boko Haram in Borno State. • December 22 - 2014 Gombe bus station bombing, at least 27 people are killed at a bus station by a bomb in Gombe State. • December 28-29 - December 2014 Cameroon clashes, 85 civilians, 94 militants, and 2 Cameroonian soldiers are killed following a failed Boko Haram offensive into Cameroon's Far North Region.
January 10, 2015	A female suicide bomber, believed to be around 10 years old, kills herself and 19 others, possibly against her will, at a market in the northeastern city of Maiduguri, Nigeria.

January 20, 2015	Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau claims responsibility for the attack on the town of Baga, Nigeria in which an unknown number of civilians were killed
January 24, 2015	15 people are killed as Boko Haram gunmen attempt to burn down the village of Kambari near Maiduguri
January 31, 2015	The African Union pledges to send up to 7,500 international soldiers to aid Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram. Chadian forces claim to have killed 120 Boko Haram fighters while losing only 3 soldiers of their own during fighting in the north of Cameroon
February 1, 2015	Boko Haram again attacks the capital city of Borno State, Maiduguri. This time, the city is attacked from four out of the five sides. The attack is unsuccessful, but many civilians inside the city panic. Also, a suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber kills himself and eight others at the residence of a politician in Potiskum. Another suicide bomber kills five people outside a mosque in Gombe
February 12, 2015	The West African Allied Forces, led by Nigeria and supported by Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, invade the Sambisa Forest in Borno State, a stronghold of Boko Haram, killing scores of the insurgents. Elsewhere, the town of Mbuta, 15 miles northeast of Maiduguri, is raided by Boko Haram, resulting in the deaths of 8 residents. A dozen people are also killed in a suicide blast at Biu, 100 miles southwest of Maiduguri
March 7, 2015	Five suicide bomb blasts leave 54 dead and 143 wounded in Maiduguri. After the explosions, Boko Haram formally declares allegiance to Islamic State
April 5, 2015	Boko Haram militants dressed as preachers killed at least 24 citizens of Kwafaja Village in Borno State, with some reports claiming that up to 50 were killed
June 22, 2015	Maiduguri Mosque Bombing - 30 killed at crowded mosque by 2 young female suicide bombers. Boko Haram marks the start of Ramadan by targeting a mosque that they see as falling short in following 'The Prophet'. The second teen appeared to run away and blew up further away, killing only herself, eyewitnesses said
November 17, 2015	A blast in the northeastern Nigerian city of Yola on Tuesday night tore through a marketplace, killing 32 people and wounding 80 others

Source: Compiled by the Researcher from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Boko_Haram_insurgency

The above table shows that there have been significant rises in both resource conflict and extremist radicalization in northern Nigeria, suggesting a connection between the two. Arising from the above analysis

and the over-whelming data presented as findings, we upheld our third hypothesis that poor management of pastoral trans-border migration is implicated in extremist radicalization in North East Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

The study concluded that seasonal nature of cross-border transhumance into Nigeria is determined by various socio-economic, political, climatic and ecological push factors arising within these countries of origin, as well as corresponding pull factors within Nigeria.

Tables showing domestic and international frameworks for transnational pastoralism in Nigeria, desertification frontline states of Nigeria, herder-farmer conflicts in northeast Nigeria between 2009 and 2015 and chronology of Boko Haram attacks

were presented to establish that poor management of pastoral trans-border migration is implicated in extremist radicalization in North East Nigeria.

It was also discovered that most of the places carved out for grazing were not gazetted by government again due to increase in human population and the need to embrace agriculture and ensure food sufficiency most of these grazing site and cattle routes have been turned into farmlands.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were made for policy implementation:

1. Government should focus on economic empowerment of the citizens as that will discourage citizens from being vulnerable to extremist radicalization. Poverty contributes to the vulnerability

of the citizens to radicalization and if the government improves human security, the situation will change.

2. Government should also in line with international best practices prevail on owners of cattle to establish ranches being what is obtainable all over world.

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