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Boko Haram Terrorism and the Decline of Military Establishment in Nigeria: A Thematic Exposition

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ABSTRACT

It is axiomatic to posit that in the last fifteen (15) years, Nigeria has had an unbeatable harvest of spurious dividends such as incessant bombings, kidnapping, armed robbery, unemployment, lack of basic social amenities and infrastructure, high rate of corruption in government and in the organized private sector among others. The security sector for instance, has continued to give sleepless nights to the Jonathan's government. During his campaign, the President indeed told Nigerian that he would tackle insecurity. The gradual slide to anarchy in the North-East part of polity, no thanks to the Boko Haram insurgency, has created a big image problem for Nigeria as a coming in the process of disintegration. Painfully, we now being compared with the likes of Somalia, Sudan and Mongolia, all of them practically failed states. In January last year President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state-of-emergency in selected local governments in Plateau, Niger, Borno, and Yobe States. The deployment necessitated the deployment of troops to all the affected local government and put the military under intense pressure. Though military hardware purchases were not made public, there was a proportional huge expenditure in the procurement of weapons and the installation of Close Circuit Television camera in parts of the country, for which an estimated ₦77 billion contract was awarded to a Chinese company. In addition to the expenditure to deal with internal insurgency, the Federal Government sent troops to Northern Mali, which had been overrun by an Al-Qaeda group. It was suspected that Boko Haram fighters were trained in the chaotic region, and early this year, government decided to send those troops to join international forces to chase Al-Qaeda and possibly Boko Haram trainees from the region. It is against these backgrounds that the Boko Haram has capitalised to exploit Nigeria's slow military decline to cause havoc. The paper discusses the major reasons that account for this decline and concludes by positing that it is sad that even with our abundant human capital and material resources the present crop or politicians cannot rise to the challenge of credible leadership and deepening our democracy.

Keywords: Military Expenditure, Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda, Military Decline, Ethno-Religious and Political identities.

INTRODUCTION

The funding of the military, especially the ongoing counter, insurgency operation, is generating heated controversy especially over who handles the money allocated to the Ministry as both the Ministry of defence (MOD) and the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) have denied handling the money. While the MOD has washed its hands off the expenditure of the military, the ONSA, too, has done the same but some officials of the former have faulted the ONSA's claim [1].

A critical section of the populace has been asking questions about the funding of the ongoing counter insurgency operation which involves the military and all the security agencies such as the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Department of the State Security Services (DSS). The controversy came to the open when the Leadership Weekend, in a story published in one of its recent edition quoted a ministry source alleging that the ministry of defence was not involved in the funding of the operation. The story further disclosed that the Presidency dealt directly with Service chiefs [2].

Checks reveal that Nigeria is not among the leading countries in defence budgeting. Military spending the world over averages about 2.5 per cent of GDP, with the USA being the highest spender - about \$113,490 billion which is about 5 per cent of GDP. In Africa, the leading military spender is Algeria, ranked 29th in the world, with 3.8 per cent of GDP, followed by Egypt (41st, 2.1 per cent), Angola (42nd, 4.2 per cent), and South Africa (43rd, 1.3 per cent). Nigeria is ranked 57th in the world then earmarking \$280 billion - about 0.9 per cent of our GDP on defence. Even a smaller country like Morocco, ranked 48th with 3.4 per cent of GDP out-spends us! In contrast, countries at near state-of-war like Lebanon (58th, 4.1 per cent) and Sudan (56th, 4.1 per cent) are in our neighbourhood in terms of defence outlays (Ademuyiwa, 2014). Egypt spends \$4 billion (35 million manpower), South Africa \$300 (34 million manpower), Ethiopia \$300 Africa \$5 billion (14 million manpower), (73 million manpower), Algeria \$ 8 billion (20 million manpower) Kenya \$5 billion (20 million manpower) and Libya \$ 880 million (3 million manpower) (SIPRI REPORTS,) [3, 4].

Between 2009 and 2014, the Federal Government allocated much of the voted N1.9 trillion defence budget to recurrent expenditure, leaving the military with little or no room to consider investments into hardware required for the defence of the nation's sovereignty. During the period under review, only N271.4 billion was capital vote, a paltry 14.3 percent of the total expenditure. This according to many military watchers, explains the seeming incapacity of the Nigerian army to 'do anything' about the Boko Haram mayhem that has swelled in the past one month. A look at the budget in the period highlighted shows that of the total allocation of N223.021 billion to the military in 2009, only N46.802 billion was capital votes while the rest N176.219 billion was recurrent [5].

In the 2010 budget, N264.206 billion was the total allocation to the military and N47.384 billion of this was capital votes while the balance N217 billion was recurrent. While appropriation to the military rose in 2011 a surprise drop in the capital votes contrasted it. Out of the N348.037 billion total appropriation, N309.784 billion was recurrent while the capital votes dropped to N34.253. The Federal Government appropriated N359.735 billion in 2012 of which N314.299 billion was recurrent and N45.436 billion was for capital. Of the N364.165 billion of the total appropriation in 2013, N305 billion was recurrent and the balance N59.251 billion was the capital votes. In the 2014 budget that was recently assented to by President Goodluck Jonathan, the federal government allocated the sum of N968.13 billion to security and defence agencies in the country. This allocation indicates a marginal increase of 1.36 per cent over the N955.46 billion allocated to these agencies in 2013. Minister of finance and coordinating minister of the economy, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, while giving a breakdown of the budget recently, said that the N968.13 billion was for all Defence agencies, including the Army, Navy Air Force, the police, as well as the ministry of interior which also includes the Civil Defence [6].

According to El-Rufai (2012) [1], for a nation that is not at war, Nigeria's defence spending raises several critical concerns. The paradox of course is that the more government spends on defence, the more insecure Nigerians feel. Travelling within the country has become so perilous that it is now advisable to get a 'security report' of all towns and villages on our way before setting out. Today, all major defence-related structures in Abuja, supposedly the safest place in the country are so barricaded that images of Baghdad and Kabul come to mind. If the state of our armed forces and defence apparatus are the way that they are in peace times, what would happen if (God forbid) Nigeria is faced with a major external threat? Or is it that the amorphous term, 'defence' is being used to pull wool over the eyes of Nigerians, while some few anointed people smile all the way to bank [7].

According to him, his objective was first to see how we compare with other nations in terms of defence spending, whether the spending priorities make sense, and then ask the standard quantity surveying question - is Nigeria getting value for the money being spent? It is vital to ask these questions because each member of our armed forces which according to US Air University's "Failed State 2030 - Nigeria as a case study" is estimated at about 76,000 in number will cost us about N4.3 million, slightly above the N3.2 million we spend per militant - and this excludes pensions, internal operations, death benefits and insurance. When these are added, each member of the armed forces cost the Nigerian citizen N4.86 million to maintain this year alone. But first, a bit of history and an overview of our defence policy and strategy would be useful in the evolving discourse [8].

The add currency to the theses above, the Nigerian Labour Congress, NLC, had called for a probe into how funds released to fight Boko Haram insurgency was spent, especially against the backdrop of continued onslaught of the sect, which had led to hundreds of deaths in recent weeks. Fielding questions in an interview in Abuja, weekend, Senator Abe, who represents Rivers South East, said: The call on the National Assembly by the Nigerian Labour Congress to investigate funds appropriated to the military to fight insurgency is a two-edged sword:

First of all, the military right now is involved in a sensitive operation to stabilize the country and provide adequate security. I we start any form of public probe and the military thinks we are only interested in the money and not the efforts at combating insurgency, that may become counterproductive. The troops would not feel supported. However, clearly there are issues dealing with the ways our security funds are being expended. We have more money than Boko Haram, we have more personnel than them, so if we spend our money properly, it should show in the field. People can't go into Maiduguri and Chibok, drive for about 200 kilometers without seeing military personnel on ground, that shows that our money is not working for us. I think it is rather between the Commander- in-Chief and the military authorities that should go back to the drawing board, find out what happened to the money that are being released for security operations and how well the money was being spent. What are the target areas of the money and who is ensuring that the money actually gets to those it should get to and that the money is achieving the purpose for which it was released. At this point, I will not advocate for the National Assembly to carry out that investigation but I will insist on a thorough, internal review of the financial dealings as regards the security votes, war on terror and the expenditure of the federal government on security. It is a very critical point and nobody should overlook it. Our troop should be well motivated with money, training and necessary equipment to prosecute the war against insurgency [9].

The essence of the paper is to examine how Boko Haram terrorists exploits Nigeria's military decline to cause havoc in the polity. To achieve this objective, preceding the introduction is the clarification of concepts. The next section discusses the cause of Nigeria military decline. The final segment of the paper offers recommendation and concludes the paper.

Theoretical Perspective: Terrorism

Terrorism is a term used to describe violence or other harmful acts. Walter Laqueur in 1999 counted over 100 definitions of terrorism and concludes that the only characteristics generally agreed upon are that terrorism involves, violence and the threat of violence [10]. The etymology of terrorism is derived from Latin words "*terrere*" which means "frighten". Terrorism is a special crime associated with violent, victimization, threatening, frightening, and disruption of socio-political atmosphere in a particular society. It is an act of bombing, killing, kidnapping, maiming and destruction

thereby creating socio-political tension, extremely fear, and destabilizing existing government or political opposition. It implies deadly attack on government agency and functionary, international organization, military and civilian in order to gain international recognition.

Terrorism is the use of violence and intimidation to achieve political ends. Terrorists want to change the way governments and politicians behave. They do not do this by voting or by trying to convince people of their arguments. They do it by frightening people into behaving the way the terrorists want [11]. [12] cited in [13] define terrorism as actions focusing on harming some people in order to create fear in others by targeting civilians and facilities or system on which civilians rely [14]. Terrorism may be viewed as a method of violence in which civilians are targeted with the objective of forcing a perceived enemy into submission by creating fear, demoralization and political friction in the population under attack [15]. In most cases, their actions do lead to the loss of innocent lives. Just as non-state actors and rogues states are known to commit terrorism at home and abroad, democratic countries also do the same in order to achieve political, religious, or other objectives [12]. Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence or, equally important, the threat of violence used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim [10]. As a form of unconventional warfare, terrorism is sometimes used when attempting to force socio-political change by convincing a government or population to agree to demands to avoid future harm or fear of harm, destabilization of existing government, motivating a discontented population to join a mutiny, escalating a conflict in the hope of upsetting the status quo, expressing an injustice, or drawing attention to a cause. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defined terrorism as Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; Appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate Governments or Societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological”. Within this definition, there are three key elements- violence, fear, and intimidation-and each element produces terror in its victims

Political terrorism is the deliberate use or threats of violence against noncombatants, calculated to instill fear in an audience beyond the immediate victims. He says that because perpetrators of terrorism often strike symbolic targets in a horrific manner, the psychological impact of an attack can exceed the physical damage. He concluded that

terrorism is a mixture of drama and dread. Despite the fact that terrorism could not be said to be a senseless violence, rather it is a premeditated political cum social strategy that threaten people with a coming danger that seem ubiquitous, unavoidable and sometimes unpreventable [13].

The U.S. Department of State defines "Terrorism" as "premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience [14]. Terrorism is a failure of political process that begins with in-equalities, corruption and injustice in a given political system, and moves from a frustrated attempt at reform that breed fear and anger, to political confrontation and conspicuously erupted into violence. This can be exploited to rationalize the use of any form of violence against any target. It seems that solutions to terrorism could be found at any stage of the evolving, or deteriorating political and social processes [15]. For this paper, political aspect of terrorism shall be considered. In terms of political terrorism, [16] defined it as the threat and/or use of extra normal form of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of achieving certain political goals or objectives. This is to influence the behaviour and attitude of certain groups. It has basically political motives. [17] defined terrorism as a deliberate employment of violence or the use of violence by sovereign states as well as some national groups, assisted by sovereign states in order to attain strategic and political objectives through the violation of law.

Eight Signs of Terrorism

The New Hampshire Department of Safety suggests 8 signs of terrorism which include the following:

- Surveillance - Someone recording or monitoring activities. This may include the use of cameras, note taking, drawing diagrams, annotating on maps, or using binoculars or other vision-enhancing devices.
- Elicitation - People or organizations attempting to gain information about military operations, capabilities, or people. Elicitation attempts may be made by mail, e-mail, telephone, or in person. This could also include eavesdropping or friendly conversation.
- Tests of Security - Any attempts to measure reaction times to security breaches, attempts to penetrate physical security barriers, or monitor procedures in order to assess strengths and weaknesses.
- Funding - Suspicious transactions involving large cash payments, deposits, or withdrawals are common signs of terrorist funding. Collections for donations, the solicitation for money and criminal activity are also warning signs.

- Supplies - Purchasing or stealing explosives, weapons, ammunition, etc. This also includes acquiring military uniforms, decals, flight manuals, passes or badges (or the equipment to manufacture such items) and any other controlled items.
- Impersonation - People who don't seem to belong in the workplace, neighborhood, business establishment, or anywhere else. This includes suspicious border crossings, the impersonation of law enforcement, military personnel, or company employees is also a sign.
- Rehearsal - Putting people in position and moving them around according to their plan without actually committing the terrorist act. An element of this activity could also include mapping out routes and determining the timing of traffic lights and flow.
- Deployment - People and supplies getting into position to commit the act. This is the person's last chance to alert authorities before the terrorist act occurs.

Causes of Nigeria's Military Decline

According to [18], two decades ago Nigeria's military was seen as a force for stability across West Africa. Now it struggles to keep security within its own borders as an Islamist insurgency in the northeast kills thousands. A lack of investment in training, failure to maintain equipment and dwindling cooperation with Western forces has damaged Nigeria's armed services, while in Boko Haram they face an increasingly well-armed, determined foe. A foe that abducted more than 270 secondary school girls in Chibok, northeastern Nigeria, nearly four months ago. The military still appears to have no idea exactly where they are, but denies it lacks the capacity to get them back.

President Goodluck Jonathan has said that Boko Haram has "infiltrated ... the armed forces and police" [19], sometimes giving the militants a head start, but the problems go much deeper. "*The Nigerian military is a shadow of what it's reputed to have once been*", "*They've fallen apart.*" [19] said James Hall, a retired colonel and former British military attaché to Nigeria. Unlike Nigerian peacekeepers in the 1990s, who were effective in curbing ethnic bloodshed in Sierra Leone and Liberia, those in Mali last year lacked the equipment and training needed to be of much use in the fight against al Qaeda-linked forces, sources involved in that mission say.

According to [20] the Nigerian peacekeepers had to buy pick-up trucks and their armor kept breaking down. They spent a lot of time on base or manning checkpoints. Military education is still taken very seriously, but equipment and training to use it have been neglected, with radio equipment in particularly in short supply.

Then Army spokesman Brigadier-General Olajide Laleye recognized some of these problems in a news conference recently. He said the army would "undertake an equipment audit ... with a view to identifying areas where equipment and material are in short supply, unserviceable or even obsolete.

CORRUPTION

Corruption like every facet of the Nigeria's human endeavour, corruption has gain surfaced as the latent factor undermining the effective countering of the insurgents. It is disheartening that in spite of hundred's of billions of naria appropriated as budgetary allocation for defence annually military equipment in the polity have been described as obsolete and inferior to those used by the Boko Haram insurgents. As a direct corollary of this, there is clear evidence of poor funding of the military, as top military brass have come out to express their frustration at the situation. For instance, The Army Chief Accountant, Major General Abdullahi Muraine, at a training workshop for the Nigerian Army Financial Corp, held in Jaji, Kaduna State, addressed the problem squarely. According to him, "Currently budgetary any allocation for the military is inadequate challenges and also cater for the welfare of the Nigerian Army. The Nigerian army is enmeshed in the Boronu State bottlenecks for the funding approvals for military operations. This calls for a review as the increasing spread at which the effects of conflict appear in operational environment will continue to challenge commanders [21]. Muraina, however, called a review of the template for funding of the military due to the current security challenges.

According to him, "the one not oblivious of the constraints on revenue generation and the fact that government has so many other responsibilities. For instance, he army budget for this year is just N4.8 billion. Now, to provide only one item for the troops engaged in the operation in the North-East will gulp most of the amount-Assuming we committed 20,000 troops, the jacket and the helmet are in the average of about US \$ 1,000, if you change that to Naria, it is about N150, 000. If you now have about 20,000 troops this means they are survey to spend about US \$ 29,000 and that is N2million. N3billion is a percentage of N4.8billion, which is the capital budget for this year, is more them 50 special and that is just on item, we are not talking about uniforms, boots, and we are not talking about training, because training is key to enhancing the lap ability of the force [22]. The Nigerian military has been criticized locally and internationally over its handling of the Boko Haram insurgency within the military junior officers have accused their superior of poor management leading to the death of several soldiers during encounters with the insurgents. Earlier in May soldiers of the 7 Division of the Nigerian Army in Maiduguri shot at the vehicle carrying their General Officer Commanding (GOC) to protest a military order that led to the death of about 12 soldiers in a Boko Haram redeployed while the mutinous soldiers are being investigated. However, a retired senior military officer who spoke to *The Nation on Sunday* on condition of anonymity agreed with the views of those who said that the military were not equipped to fight this war. According to him,

The war against terrorism or even a conventional war in this country cannot be won with the way things are going presently. Asked to expatiate on what he meant he said,

our system of military funding is fraught with corruption and open to clear abuse. Military budgets should never be given to military commanders or chief of army staff as it is obtained presently. This is because it opens the system to corruption and abuse. The procurement system that is applicable in the United States and the United Nations is the best [5].

According to the retired military officer, who is widely exposed and had gone on several military and command postings under the UN in Liberia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc, what obtains in the UN and the United State system is that the commander makes requests of what is needed and they are supplied. The commander, according to him, does not deal with physical cash or any military contractor thus making sure they get what they need. He is of the opinion that the present system where contracts for building of military barracks, hospitals and such are awarded by military personnel is wrong and open to abuse. He said this was responsible for military officers living large in and out of retirement because they help themselves with the votes meant for buying equipment. He pointed out that our military barracks are today in poor shape compared to others anywhere in the world. He asked: *“How do you expect a soldier housed in a facility that is like a pen to fight an enemy with determination?”* He pointed out that the protest by wives of soldiers in Borno state a few weeks back should have woken up the country to the reality of the situation it was facing. He referred to the firing incident which also occurred in the barracks there. According to him, not even during the country’s civil war did soldiers fire at their commanding officer during a parade.

Sabotage

The fundamental challenge of efforts at bringing security to the affected states is the problem of sabotage, as there is genuine apprehension that Boko Haram insurgents have sympathizers in the military. For instance the news media across Nigeria recently reported that ten Generals and five other Senior Military Officers were found guilty in courts-martial of providing arms and information to Boko Haram extremists.

The news follows months of allegations from politicians and soldiers who have said that some senior officers were helping the Islamic extremists and that some rank-and-file soldiers even fight alongside the insurgents and then return to army camps. They have said that information provided by army officers has helped insurgents in ambushing military convoys and in attacks on army barracks and outposts in their north-eastern stronghold. *Leadership* newspaper quoted one officer saying that four other officers, in addition to the 15, were found guilty of “being disloyal and for working for the members of the sect.” Defence Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Chris Olukolade did not immediately respond to requests for comment on Tuesday. Last week, he denied that senior military officers were being investigated for helping Boko Haram and sabotaging a year-old offensive to curb the 5-year-old uprising that has killed thousands [23].

Boko Haram has attracted international condemnation and UN sanctions since its April 15 abduction of more than 300 schoolgirls, of whom 272 remain captive. *Leadership* newspaper quoted military officers saying the 15 are among many more being tried at divisional level. The verdicts are being referred to defence headquarters in Abuja, the capital, where the fate of the officers will be decided, the newspaper said. The officers it quoted spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not allowed to give information to reporters. President Goodluck Jonathan said last year that he believed that some members of the military and even of his own government, including some Cabinet ministers, sympathized with Boko Haram or belonged to the group.

Lack of intelligence support

In conventional war, the military relies a lot on the support base for an efficient campaign: this is even more important in an in conventional war. In the war against insurgents the success or other wise of any operation usually rests on the quality of he intelligence support basic. Again, the poor or absence of intelligence support has been attributed to lack of funding. According to *Daily Nation* when local people warned that hundreds of militants were heading towards Chibok, Danuma Mphur hurried to summon help. As chairman of the Parent teachers association (PTA) at the Government Girls Secondary School, Mphur feared for the safety of children who were staying there to take exams. The 15 soldiers in Chibok were no match for the forces of Boko Haram, a militant group waging a war against the state Reinforcements were needed, fast. Mphur says he called the police and the local government chairman.

In turn, the Local Government Chairman also called the Police and Contacted the Military Commander in Chibok between 9:30pm and 10pm on that evening according to Kashim Shettima, the governor of Borno state, which includes Chibok. Backup never arrived. The military said in a statement that it rfeceived no warning about the attack. It added that when reinforcements were sent, they were abused on the "120km rugged and tortuous road" from Maiduguri, the state capital, and delayed. Chibok's local government chairman could not be contacted for comment [24].

Either way, about four hours after Mphur rang for help, Boko Haram militants swept into Chibok and abducted 276 girls from the school, while 57 escaped, according to the state governments, most are still missing, and Boko Haram has threatened to sell them in the market. Though the military said recently that it knows where the girls are, it has ruled out using force to try to rescue them. The mass kidnap on the night of April 14 sparked headlines world-wide but it was far from the first misstep in war against Boko Haram. Interviews with witnesses to the kidnapping, military and security officials, western diplomats and counter terrorism experts, highlight a series of failings by politicians and the military in the struggle against the group, not just in the hours leading up to the raid on the school, but over few years [24].

Low Morale

According to [25], morale is also a problem, says a ground soldier deployed in the northeast who did not wish to be named. He said the food was bad, sleeping conditions rough, very few people get the leave to which they are entitled, and they live in constant fear of Boko Haram attacks. According to him, *"There is just a kind of hopelessness hanging over us,"* [25]. Not so their adversaries, whose fearless determination is fuelled by dreams of jihadist martyrdom. For Jacob Zenn, a Boko Haram expert at U.S. counter-terrorism institution CTC Sentinel, *"In a typical unit, Boko Haram has between 300 and 500 fighters. It's not a guerrilla force that you can fight half heartedly," "It's snowballing. It's getting more weapons, more recruits, their power is increasing every day."*

On February 12 dozens of fighters loyal to Boko Haram attacked a remote military outpost in the Gwoza hills. A security source with knowledge of the assault said they came in Hilux tracks with mounted machine guns and showered the camp with gunfire. Boko Haram's fighters had little cover and were easily picked off - 50 of them died against nine Nigerian troops - but they still managed to make off with the base's entire armory stockpile of 200 mortar bombs, 50 rocket-propelled grenades and hundreds of rounds of ammunition [26]. Their ability to dart over the border into Cameroon, whose own security forces have shown little appetite for taking them on, gives the militants an added advantage.

Divisions, low morale and corruption within the military have allowed the militants to reign terror in some parts of the northeast. Since an initial uprising in 2009, Boko Haram's campaign to create a breakaway Islamic state has accelerated. It has now killed more than 5,000 people, including an estimated 1,800 this year alone. A bitter struggle between the federal government and at least two state governors in the northeast has made it harder to coordinate a response to the group, say analysts and security sources. For some time now, President Goodluck Jonathan and some state governors in the North-East geo-political zone of the country have been trading blames on the cause of the Boko Haram insurgency and the growing insecurity in that part of the country. The president, at the recent North-East zonal rally of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Bauchi, slammed governors in the zone for trying to make the Federal Government feel guilty by shifting the blame for the insecurity in the area on it. On the contrary, he blamed the governors for failing to discharge their constitutional responsibility of educating youths in the zone, with majority of the youths having never attended primary school, resulting in the situation where they easily decided to carry arms. He also accused the governors of failing in other parameters of governance.

President Jonathan's stance is apparently a direct response to the allegation by 12 Northern governors, during a recent visit to the White House in America, that he was escalating the Boko Haram crisis ahead of the 2015 election. Governor Murtala Nyako of Adamawa State had, at the occasion, accused the Federal Government of fuelling

terrorism in the North-East with the objective of reducing the voting population of the zone. Earlier in the year, Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima, had also criticized the Federal Government's efforts on the insurgency in the North-East, arguing that Boko Haram members were better armed and motivated than the Nigerian military personnel deployed to stop them. The president had, at the time, also taken a strong exception to this.

Opinion leaders from the zone believe that the mass kidnapping could have been prevented if the government had taken the necessary steps. Boko Haram roughly translates as western education is forbidden, and in 2012 the militant group announced it would specifically target schools. Since then, Boko Haram militants have torched numerous schools and abducted or killed hundreds of children, according to a senior military source. Three Western intelligence sources estimate Boko Haram was holding between 200 and 300 girls as slaves even before the raid on Chibok. Dozens have escaped but security forces have failed to interview many survivors even though their information could help combat Boko Haram or assist in finding girls still held captive, kidnap victims and security sources said. One escapee was girl abducted by Boko Haram in a mountainous region near Cameroon last year. No one ever came to ask me questions after I escaped. I could help them find others, she told Reuters.

Ethno-Religious and Political Differences

Ethnic and religious divisions within the military have also bred some collusion with Boko Haram, sources say. An artillery soldier said units were sometimes suspiciously ambushed. He is convinced "*someone in command leaks our plans to terrorists*" [27]. Former U.S. Ambassador John Campbell adds that "*The military, just like the rest of Nigeria, is fractured, which means it probably does have Boko Haram sympathizers within it*" [28].

The military isn't that short of money on paper. In 2014 security will swallow nearly 968 billion naira, a quarter of the federal budget. Of that, the defense ministry will take more than a third, but only 10 percent is for capital spending. A government advisor says there was some evidence a few senior officers were pocketing money meant for equipment, so corruption may also be a factor in the shortfalls. A senior security official, who declined to be identified, said the process of decline in the military has been gradual, starting when the military seized power in the 1960s.

According to [29] Britain, France and the United States had been Nigeria's main military assistance partners, but they gradually backed off from its increasingly quirky and corrupt military dictators, culminating with the venal Sani Abacha in the 1990s. In the 21st century, Nigeria, now democratic, can be prickly about meeting conditions on military assistance packages, Western diplomats and military officials say, such as giving Western trainers full access to its bases, intelligence sharing and improving its human rights record. As one U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity

said: *"The human rights issue has been a point of friction for a long time in Nigeria"* [30]. The military has repeatedly denied allegations of abuses such as summary executions, but Amnesty International condemned the alleged killing of hundreds of prisoners escaping from Giwa barracks last June. The military said it had no choice but to prevent their escape.

Military Regime Turnover

According to [27], foreign aid aside, decades of coups made unstable military regimes fear their own armed forces. Each coup plot led to a deliberate under-funding of any department under suspicion. A botched 1985 counter-coup against newly installed Ibrahim Babangida was rumored to involve planned aerial bombardments, so his junta cut funds to the air force, a security official who remembers the time says. Another failed coup in 1990 allegedly involved military police, so their budget was squeezed. When democracy returned in 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo, himself a former military ruler, feared the army, too. As Campbell said, *"this starvation of the military has occurred since Obasanjo, as part of a strategy to ensure they couldn't conduct more coups,"* [27]

Porous Borders

The lack of control of movement of person across the country's borders has been identified as a major challenge, which the Boko Haram insurgents have effectively taken advantage to unleash terror on the innocent villagers across Nigeria in general and the North East in Particular.

Recommendations

The triple problems of security challenge, poor infrastructure and weak economy that bedeviled the North east sub-region, has become a serious source of concern to leaders and followers alike in the region. This concern prompted the gathering of leaders, elites, the business society and others under the aegis of the North-east Economic summit in Gombe, with the country's number one citizen, President Goodluck Jonathan in attendance. The six states in the North east sub-region invited experts and relevant government functionaries to analyze the challenges, potentials and prospects of the region with the hope of providing a viable and realistic solution to the problems dragging the sub-region backwards.

We find the current shifting of blames on the cause of the raging Boko Haram Problem inexpedient. The middle of the battle against the sect's bloody campaign is not the proper time for the president and the affected state governors to be dissipating energy on the causes of this insurgency. This is not a period to ask who is right or wrong on the Boko Haram Affair, but to act, and design measures to bring the insurgency to its knees. If the truth must be told, this insurgency is largely a fallout of the failure to ensure the education of large numbers of youths in the North-East over the years. Under the 1999 Constitution, each state has a responsibility to do this, and to create enabling environment for the youths to thrive.

State governors are also chief security officers of their states, albeit with the incongruity of police commissioners being directly responsible to the Inspector-General of Police in Abuja. The governors have responsibility to ensure that their states are properly secured. It is heartening, however, that the state governors have indicated their appreciation of the importance of education with their recent decision to introduce free education in all Northern states. This was a step taken in the Western part of the country in 1955, and in the East, in 1958.

The challenge for the Northern states, today, is to make primary and secondary school education free and widely available in the region, while the Federal Government does all it can to assist them, because of the enormity of the problem. This is an important shared responsibility, which does not call for throwing of unhelpful brick bats and public castigation of the affected governors by the president.

The North east sub-region has undoubtedly been devastated by the insurgency and desperately needs the support of the Federal Government to effectively provide the much needed security and welfare to the people. As a measure to check the vulnerability of idle youth into being engaged in unholy acts, the federal and state government must evolve strategic programmes to engage the youth so as to give them hope and opportunities to be useful to themselves, the society and the nation. The first line of defence for insecurity is peace and development.

The North-east sub region is undoubtedly blessed with rich agricultural potentials which if exploited will turn around the economy of the states and their people. From Mambilla Plateau to Ibbi on the Banks of River Benue in Taraba state to the Dadin Kowa Green Belt in Gombe state. From Dasin to Madagali in Adamawa state and the Bauchi plains, these are vast arable lands most suitable for livestock, rice, maize, Ground nuts and cotton production. From the plains of the Lake Chad basin to Biu in Borno state. In Yobe state, the Gashua, Jakusko and Nguru wetlands as well as the vast oasis in Yunusari, Yusufari, Bursari, Tarmuwa and Giedam are most suitable for large scale livestock and agricultural practice to earn the state good foreign exchange. Similarly, the Gum Arabic plantations spread across the state are sources of viable economic fortunes. In view of these rich potentials, it has therefore become imperative for the federal government to partner with the state governments to fully exploit the agricultural deposits to generate revenue, enhance economic growth and ensure sustainable security in the sub-region.

In the spirit of true federalism, the people must not be neglected and to be seen as leaving them to their fate. Governments at the federal and states must exhibit true commitment and dedicated political will to putting the outcome of the summit into action for a lasting solution to the problems of the North-east and, Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

A worrisome dimension to the Boko Haram insurgency was recorded on June 7, 2011, when the sect attacked the police headquarters in Abuja. The police headquarters attack ushered a wave of violent attacks by Boko Haram. First directed against Southern,

Christians and government target, including the United Nations Building in Abuja, they have been extended to Moslems as well. So far, an estimated 10,000 lives have been claimed by the insurgency since to 2011. A recent report by the UN put the figure to nearly 500,000 people in Northern Nigeria have fled their homes over fear of what it calls an “increasing monstrous” insurgency that threatens food security in many parts of the country, as farmers have abandoned their fields. The report further said what was formerly an internal conflict has become a regional crisis, as the insurgency has spilled cross borders into neighbouring West African Countries.

In another report, Human Rights Watch (2011) said 2014 may be the worst year of the insurgency. It said Boko Haram has since January have Killed more than 700 people in attacks on 40 villages and displaced hundreds of thousands. Beside the high human casualty figure, the insurgency has in the past three years taken a large chunk of the national budget. As at September 2013, government said it has spent our N1.37trillion tackling insecurity in Nigeria. Sadly, the excesses of the Boko Haram sect have painted a picture of some failure of government in making any meaningful achievement Analyst also believed that the inability of government to address the challenge has affected the level of progress that would have been achieved in other sectors.

For the majority of Nigerians, the greatest desire is for the authorities to end this mindless insurgency. May 14 2014, made it one year since emergency rule was declared in some selected local councils in Nigeria. Has the emergency measure achieved the desired effect? Will it be called off, or renewed, thereby putting the states perpetually under emergency rule? What new measures can the government adopt to curb this problem? These are serious issues that the Federal Government and the affected state governors should be thinking about, not trading blames on the cause of the insurgency. One thing that is certain is that the measures so far adopted to confront terrorism in Northern Nigeria are not enough. It has become necessary to re-tool the campaign against Boko Haram to end the menace and restore peace in the affected parts of the country.

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